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PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS
The Utah State Engineer is aware of no prior or related appeals in this
matter.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs appeal from the Seventh District Court's order on de novo review
of two change applications for approved water rights. The Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, transferred from the Utah Supreme Court,
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 2014) .
...(jf)

ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue 1: On the district court's review by trial de novo for two change
applications, did the court properly conclude that there is reason to believe the
Green River has sufficient unappropriated water for the change applications?

Standard of Review: Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (West Supp. 2014)
provides the legal measure against which applications submitted to the State
Engineer are approved or denied. Change applications for water rights measured
against statutory criteria often involve technical and complex factual evidence.
The trial court on de novo review, weighs the evidence against the statute and
makes findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine whether there is
"reason to believe" the application meets the criteria and should be approved.
Vj)

Deciding this type of question on appeal-whether the facts fall within the ambit
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of the statute-is a mixed question of fact and law. The standard of review for
such mixed questions in water applications has been examined and defined by
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 16, ,r 15, 133 P.3d 382. See also In re
Adoption ofBaby B., 2012 UT 35, iJ 42 308 P.3d 382.

In Searle, the Utah Supreme Court examined the standard of review where a
trial court rejected a change application based on the "impairment" criterion of
section 73-3-8. The Searle Court reviewed the issue as a mixed question of fact
and law because "the district court must first find facts relevant to the issue of
impairment and then determine whether those facts are within the ambit of
'impairment' such that the change application should be rejected [or approved]."
Searle, 2006 UT 16, at ,r 15, (citing Jensen v. IHC Hasps., 2003 UT 51, ,r 57 n. 11,

82 P.3d 1076 ("A mixed question involves ... the determination of whether a
given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law." (internal
quotation marks omitted))); cf Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest
Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, ,r 43, 98 P.3d 1 (reviewing a district court's

determination that water was put to beneficial use as a mixed question of fact and
law).
Thus, examining whether an application meets the statutory criteria is a
mixed question of law and fact where trial courts are given "significant, but not
broad discretion" in applying this statute to given facts with the reason-to-believe
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standard. Searle, 2006 UT 16 at ,r 18 (citing Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.,
y)

2004 UT 67, iJ 50).
Further, under In re Adoption ofBaby B., 2012 UT 35 at iJ 42, in mixed
questions of law and fact, the appellate court's review "depends on the nature of
the issue and the marginal costs and benefits of a less deferential, more heavyhanded appellate touch." Because "(m ]ixed question fall somewhere in the
twilight between deferential review of findings of fact and searching
reconsideration of conclusions of law," the Baby B. court examined a sliding scale
of sorts to measure the degree of deference to afford trial courts for mixed
questions, stating that "[ o ]n mixed questions ... our review is sometimes
deferential and sometimes not." Id. The degree of deference afforded the trial
court depends on: (1) the degree of variety or complexity of the facts to which the
legal rule is applied, (2) the degree to which the trial court's application of the
legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge that cannot be adequately
reflected in the record for appellate review, and (3) other policy reasons that weigh
for or against granting discretion to trial courts. Id. Under these factors, each of
the section 73-3-8 criteria for a change application weighs in favor of giving
significant discretion to the trial court's decision.
Considering the Baby B. factors, the "unappropriated water" analysis
depends on both questions of law-the meaning of section 73-3-8(1)(a)(i) in the

3

change application context-and technical and complex questions of fact. The
trial court's ruling on this point necessarily construed the statutory appropriation
criterion in the change application context. Thus, because the trial court's
application of facts to its conclusions of law was both technical and complex, this
Court should afford the trial court significant but not broad discretion in
determining whether it had reason to believe there is unappropriated water in the
Green River for the change applications.

Preservation: R. 10-12; R. 622-628 (attached as Add. A).
Issue 2: On the district court's review by trial de novo for two change
applications, did the court properly conclude that there is reason to believe the
applications would not unreasonably affect public recreation and the natural
stream environment?

Standard of Review: See standard of review for Issue 1. Using the three
Baby B. factors, the complexity of the record facts subject to the section 73-3-8
criterion militates for broad discretion to the trial court's determination that the
change applications would not unreasonably affect public recreation and the
natural stream environment.

Preservation: R. 22-24; R. 640-644 (Add A).
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Issue 3: On the district court's review by trial de novo for two change
~

applications, did the court properly conclude that there is reason to believe the
applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works?
Standard of Review: See standard of review for Issue 1. Because the facts

were relatively straightforward, the trial court's construction and application of the
section 73-3-8(1)(a)(iv) financial ability criterion should be afforded significant
but not broad discretion.
Preservation: R. 18-20; R. 636-638 (Add. A).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-3(5)(a) (West Supp. 2014):
73-3-3. Permanent or temporary changes in point of diversion, place of use,
or purpose of use.

****

(5) (a)
The state engineer shall follow the same procedures, and the rights
and duties of the applicants with respect to applications for permanent changes of
point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use shall be the same, as provided in
this title for applications to appropriate water.

****
Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-8(1) (West Supp. 2014):
73-3-8. Approval or rejection of application -- Requirements for approval -Application for specified period of time -- Filing of royalty contract for
removal of salt or minerals.
(1) (a)
It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve an application if:
(i)
there is unappropriated water in the proposed source;
(ii) the proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the
more beneficial use of the water;
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(iii) the proposed plan is physically and economically feasible, unless the
application is filed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, and would
not prove detrimental to the public welfare;
(iv) the applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works;
and
(v)
the application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of
speculation or monopoly.
(b) (i) If the state engineer, because of information in the state engineer's
possession obtained either by the state engineer's own investigation or
otherwise, has reason to believe that an application to appropriate water will
interfere with its more beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary,
stock watering, power or mining development, or manufacturing, or will
unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural stream environment, or
will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it is the state engineer's duty to
withhold approval or rejection of the application until the state engineer has
investigated the matter.
(ii) If an application does not meet the requirements of this section, it
shall be rejected.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a trial court decision approving
two Change Applications (Change Applications or Applications), designated on
the State Engineer's files as 89-74 (a35402) and 09-462 (a35874), filed
respectively by Kane County Water Conservancy District and San Juan Water
Conservancy District (the Districts). The State Engineer's orders approving the
Applications resulted from routine informal adjudicative proceedings under Utah
Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (West Supp. 2014). The trial court, in a consolidated case on
both Applications, reviewed the Applications by trial de novo as the Utah

6

Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(l)(a) (West Supp.
2014), requires.

Course of Proceedings. The Districts initiated two informal adjudicative
proceedings in 2009 by filing two Change Applications with the State Engineer's
office. Kane County Water Conservancy District, on March 30, 2009, filed
Application for Permanent Change of Water a35402, based on approved Water
Rights 89-74, 89-1285, and 89-1513 (Kane Application). Ex. 5. San Juan Water
Conservancy District, on August 27, 2009, filed Application for Permanent
~

Change of Water a35874, based on approved Water Right 09-462 (San Juan
Application). Ex. 1. The Applications sought to change the original points of
diversion and the places of use for the underlying water rights to a single location
on the Green River and to add storage capacity to facilitate use for power
vjj)

generation. Ex. 5 at 1-4; Ex. 1 at 1-3. Both districts leased their water rights to
Blue Castle Holdings, Inc. (Blue Castle), Ex. 9A, 9C, and 10A, or to a predecessor
who assigned the lease to Blue Castle, for use in power generation. Ex. 9B and
l0B. The leases, for terms of forty or more years, are contingent on filed and
approved changes. Ex. 9A at ,r,r 2, 6-9; Ex. 9C at ,r,r 2, 6-9; Ex. l0A at ,r,r 2,

vii

7-10.
After the State Engineer advertised the Applications, as Utah Code Ann. §
,,ijJ)

73-3-6 (West Supp. 2014) requires, Ex. 6 at 1 and Ex. 2 at 1, protestors filed forty-
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nine protests, including four late protests, on the Kane Application, Ex. 6 at 1-2,
and twenty-seven protests, including three late protests, on the San Juan
Application. Ex. 2 at 1. The State Engineer held an informal administrative
hearing on each Application in Green River, Utah, on January 12, 2010. Ex. 6 at 2;
Ex. 2 at 2. He approved the Applications in separate orders on January 20, 2012.
Ex. 6 at 22; Ex. 2 at 22.
Plaintiffs sought de novo review of both orders in the Seventh Judicial
District Court. R. at 4 Gurisdiction claimed under Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-402,
-404, (West 2009 & Supp. 2014) and Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (West Supp.
2014) and named Kent Jones, the Utah State Engineer, as a respondent under Utah
Code Ann. § 73-3-14(2)). The court approved the applications by final order
entered April 21, 2014. R. 648-49 (Add. A). The court's thoughtful 36-page
order found facts and made conclusions of law on each statutory criterion against
which change applications are measured. R. 621-48. Employing a reason-tobelieve standard, R. 619-20, the court ruled that the Applications met the statutory
criteria, R. 648-49, and approved them subject to enumerated conditions. R. 64849 (Add. A). Appellants, unsuccessful protestants in the State Engineer's
administrative process and plaintiffs in the district court, now appeal to this Court.

Statement of Relevant Facts. The water rights that underlie the two
Change Applications, initially appropriated for steam power generation at a coal-
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fired power plant, are located in three water sources. Ex. 5 at 1, ,r 2C; Ex. 1 at 1, il
5. The Kane County Water Conservancy District (Kane) water rights had prior
sources of supply in both Wahweap Creek and Lake Powell. Ex. 5 at 1, iJ 2C. The
San Juan County Water Conservancy District (San Juan) water right originated in
the San Juan River. Ex. 1 at 1, ,r 5. Kane and San Juan applied to move the water
rights from these smaller tributaries and Lake Powell upstream to the Green River
for Blue Castle's use. Ex. 5 at 2-3, ,r 5B and C; Ex. 1 at 2, ,r,r 15, 17. The Green
River, which is the largest tributary to the Colorado River, is in turn fed by several
tributaries below the Flaming Gorge Reservoir including the Yampa River, the
Duchesne River, the White River, the Price River, and the San Rafael River,
before it joins the Colorado River. Ex. 20 at 3; see also Ex. 67. The Applications
sought to divert water from the Green River below the city of Green River, Utah,
~

and below all the significant tributaries except the San Rafael River. Ex. 5 at 2-3,

il 5B-C; Ex.

1 at 2, ilil 15, 17.

The matter before the trial court on de novo review was the same matter the
State Engineer considered-whether to approve or reject the Districts'
Applications and what conditions to impose if the applications were approved. 1 A
1

Such de novo review essentially put the trial court in the shoes of the State
Engineer to evaluate the Applications anew against the section 73-3-8 criteria.
Archer v. Bd ofState Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Utah 1995);
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co. 2006 UT 16, ,r 34, 133 P.3d 382 (quoting United
States v. Dist. Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1951)) ('"[T]he decision of the
9

trial court decides anew whether to approve or reject administrative applications.
Unlike the State Engineer's administrative decisions, however, trial and appellate
courts are courts of law and, upon judicial review of State Engineer orders, their
decisions "become the law of the case, are res judicata, and are binding precedent
on the law the same as other decisions by such courts on other matters."2 E. Bench
Irrigation Co. v. State, 300 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1956). Likewise, trial de novo
presents the district court with "the opportunity to correct any deficiencies that
may arise because of the informal nature of administrative proceedings and
provides an adequate record for future review." Archer v. Bd. of State Lands &
Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144-1145 (Utah 1995). Plaintiffs, under section 73-314(2) of the Utah Code, must join the State Engineer as a defendant in the trial
court's de novo review. As a statutory defendant, he carries no burden of

court on review, except for the formalities of the trial and judgment is of the same
nature and for the same purpose [as that of the State Engineer]."').
The State Engineer, under section 73-3-14(2) of the Utah Code, must be
joined as a defendant in the trial court's de novo review and may find himself in
one of three general postures. First, he may align with a successful applicant.
Second, he may stand alone or with protestants against a denied applicant. Third,
he may stand alone or align with protestants against an unhappily restricted
successful applicant. In the present case, he was aligned with the successful
applicant and his role on de novo review was to explain his reasoning and
administrative order to the trial court to fully inform the court on the Applications,
their complexities, and how they will affect the water system and other uses.
2

Presumably the Utah Supreme Court's reference to "binding precedent"
applies only to appellate court decisions.
10

persuasion, a burden borne at all times by the applicant. Searle, 2006 UT 16 at ,r
54 ("[T]he burden of persuasion remains on the change applicant throughout the
application process."). The trial court, on de novo review, finds facts and
determines whether those facts fall within the reach of section 73-3-8. If the facts
show that the application meets the statutory criteria, the court approves the
application. In deciding this mixed question of law and fact, the trial court
necessarily construes the language of section 73-3-8.
Whether the relevant facts in this matter fulfill the section 73-3-8 criteria
informs the State Engineer's performance of his duties with respect to similar
applications, and aids him in applying the relevant statutes to daily administrative
·vi)

operations and decisions. In this matter, the State Engineer believes the trial court
construed and applied the criteria appropriately. Because Plaintiffs have not

--s)

shown that the record evidence fails to support the reasonable belief that the
criteria are met, there is no ground to disturb the district court's decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Blue Castle, on behalf of the applicant Districts, demonstrated, based on a
reason-to-believe standard of proof, that the Applications meet each of the section
73-3-8 approval criteria. The court examined those criteria, involving findings of
unappropriated water, public welfare, and applicant financial ability, and others.
The court, after trial de novo, made findings of fact and conclusions of law on

11

each issue. Because weighing facts against statutory criteria in water application
cases present mixed questions of law and fact, the district court's findings and
conclusions are generally due significant though not broad deference.
Evidence before the trial court showed that there is unappropriated water in
the Green River, which is the proposed source of supply for the changed water
rights. The trial court determined there is unappropriated water available for Blue
Castle's use in the Green River. R. 627-628 (Add. A).
Likewise, the court properly concluded that the proposed diversion to
supply Blue Castle's power plant project will not unreasonably affect public
recreation or the natural stream environment. Although the trial court carefully
evaluated these issues as independent factors in approval, that evaluation
illustrated judicial care rather than statutory necessity.
The trial court also determined applicants' project is financially feasible and
that they have the financial ability to complete it. Plaintiffs touch on several other
section 73-3-8 criteria which they fail to identify in their stated issues. The trial
court appropriately ruled in applicants' favor with respect to each criterion, and
therefore reasonably approved the Applications. This Court, affording the trial
court significant deference for these mixed questions, should affirm.

12
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE REASON-TO-BELIEVE STANDARD IS MEANINGFUL, BUT
LOW

The Utah State Engineer, as the state's authority on water and director of the
Division of Water Rights, is "responsible for the general administrative
supervision of the waters of the state and the measurement, appropriation,
~

apportionment, and distribution of those waters." Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-1(3)(a)
(West Supp. 2014); see also Utah Code Ann.§§ 73-2-1.1, 73-2-1.2 (West 2004).
Utah citizens apply to the State Engineer's office to acquire new water rights
where water is available, and where it is not, for approval to change the use of
existing water rights. Utah Code Ann.§§ 73-3-1(1), 73-3-2, 73-3-3 (West Supp.
2014). Whether the submitted application is to acquire or to change a water right,
the standard of review is the same: whether there is "reason to believe" the
application complies with the applicable statutory criteria. Searle v. Milburn

Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 15, ilil 31, 43-46. The district court, conducting a trial de
novo of an application, also determines application approval under this reason-tobelieve standard. Id. at ilil 35, 42.
Plaintiffs correctly cite to Searle for the principle that, in the trial court, the
statutory requirements provide a "meaningful barrier so that the floodgates remain
..,Ji)

closed to all applications except those with a sufficient probability of successful
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perfection." 2006 UT 15, at iJ 45. They also correctly point out that, under Searle,
the applicant bears the burden of persuasion throughout the application process.
Aplt. Brief at 32. However, they omit from their Searle explanation that reasonto-believe is a relatively low hurdle meant to encourage maximizing beneficial
use. The Supreme Court said:
Although at first blush it appears that this procedure unjustly
favors new appropriations and new uses to the detriment of vested
rights, the procedure actually provides a balance between the two
policy goals of putting water to the most beneficial use possible while
simultaneously guarding vested rights. The procedure accomplishes
this by placing a fairly low burden on a party seeking approval of a
change application, thereby allowing the party to attempt to perfect
the right to use the water in the manner contemplated by the
application. If such use can be accomplished without interfering with
vested rights, the policy of putting water to the best use possible is
furthered without causing injury to anyone.
2006 UT 16, at iJ 36 (internal citations omitted). The Court also acknowledged
that, "[t]he value of allowing experimentation cannot be understated." Id. at iJ 38.
A change application, after all, is not the final adjudication of a water right,
and the burden of persuasion used to determine compliance with statutory criteria
is akin to, but distinct from, the probable cause standard in criminal cases. Id. at

,I,I 33, 46-47. "Determining whether an applicant has, in fact, proven that the new
manner of use does not impair vested rights is a matter ultimately left to a final
judicial determination of rights," the Court noted. Id. at iJ 37. Likewise,
"[p ]ursuing a policy that allows experimentation with water use is not antithetical
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to a strong and legitimate desire to protect the vested rights of other water users."
~

Id. at ,I 39. For change applications, the reason-to-believe standard with the
section 73-3-8 criteria is relatively low to allow for experimentation and promote
the "utmost" development of water. Id. at ,I 37 (citing Eardley v. Terry, 77 P.2d
362, 366-67 (1938)).
The trial court appropriately applied the Searle standard when it granted the
Applications. Plaintiffs make bare quotations to Searle without analysis or
citation to the record. They pick and choose their references in a simplistic and
incorrect fashion. Aplt. Brief at 31-33. They conclude by saying that "far from
meeting the Applicants' burden of persuasion, the application is incomplete and
does not provide the necessary statutory information to support an approval by the
State Engineer." Aplt. Brief at 33. Plaintiffs err. They fail to marshal any of the
evidence that contradicts their assertions. They likewise fail to quote the relevant
language from the Searle opinion. They fail to provide citations to the record
supporting their argument or identifying issue preservation. And they even fail to
correctly address their arguments to the trial court's decision rather than the State
Engineer's approval process. This Court should not take seriously Plaintiffs'
baseless conclusion that the Applications fail to meet the criteria for approval.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THERE IS
REASON TO BELIEVE THE CHANGE APPLICATIONS MEET
THE SECTION 73-3-8 CRITERION FOR UNAPPROPRIATED
WATER

In Utah water belongs to the public. Utah Code Ann.§ 73-1-1(1) (West
Supp. 2014). All potential users must apply to the State Engineer for authority to
withdraw water from the natural environment. Id. § 73-3-1(1), (2) (West Supp.
2014). Water rights depend on beneficial water use. Id. § 73-1-3 (West 2004); id.

~,

§ 73-3-1 (4). Compliance with mandated criteria ascertained by the State Engineer
or trial court on de novo review determines application approval. Id. §§ 73-3-8, -

Gv

10 (West Supp. 2014). Here the Districts hold approved applications to
appropriate water. See Ex. 4 at 1, Ex. 8A-8C; R. 626 (Add. A). Such approved
applications may be changed in the same manner as perfected water rights. Utah
Code Ann.§ 73-3-3(8)(a) (West Supp. 2014).
Changeable characteristics of water rights include the point of diversion,
place of use, and purpose of use, id. § 73-3-3(2)(a), and a change application to the
State Engineer initiates an informal administrative proceeding governed by both
water statutes and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Id. §§ 73-33, -5, -6 to -16 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); id. §§ 63G-4-101 to -601 (West 2009
& Supp. 2014); Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-2. Statutes and case law direct the
State Engineer to scrutinize change applications as he would new applications. Id.
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§ 73-3-3(5)(a) (West Supp. 2014); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,499,502
;;;

(Utah 1989). Applying the appropriation criteria to change applications requires
an understanding of change applications. The trial court correctly approved the
Applications because there was reason to believe the Applications meet the
statutory criteria in section 73-3-8.
For applications to appropriate water for a new water right, section 73-38(l)(a)(i) requires a finding of ''unappropriated water in the proposed source." In
Bonham v. Morgan, the Utah Supreme Court said that all of the section 73-3-8
criteria also apply to applications to change existing water rights. Bonham v.
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1989); Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-3(5)(a) (West
Supp. 2014). Applying the section 73-3-8 criteria, both the State Engineer and the
trial court correctly determined that there was reason to believe the Districts'

..i;

Change Applications met the requirements for approval, including the need for
unappropriated water in the proposed source.
Compliance with this criterion depends on the trial court's findings
concerning complex facts. Construction of the statute in the context of change
applications is, however, more law-like than fact-like. In re Adoption ofBaby B.,
2012 UT 35 at, 42. The trial court's conclusions of law on the abstract legal
question of what constitutes "unappropriated water" may therefore be afforded
less deference than the significant discretion given the trial court on whether the
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complex facts are within the reach of the stated legal rule. The trial court did
correctly interpret the statutory criterion and, applying the facts to that standard,
reached a reasonable belief that unappropriated water is available for the
Applications in the Green River.

A.

The district court correctly concluded that water is available in
the Colorado River system under Utah's Colorado River
allocation

Section 73-3-8(l)(a)'s first criterion is that "there is unappropriated water in
the proposed source[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2014). As
a matter of fact and law, the trial court reasonably held that unappropriated water
exists for the Districts' Change Applications. As the trial court put it, "there are at
least 574,600 acre-feet of approved yet undeveloped water in the Upper Colorado
River Basin in Utah." R. 623 (Add. A). The court found that "[m]ost of this
574,600 acre-feet of water has not been applied to beneficial use, and it is
unappropriated water available for use by those with approved applications at least
up to the limit of Utah's Colorado River allocation." R. 623

,r,r 27, 28 (Add. A).

Although the State Engineer commonly uses the term "unappropriated" to mean
only water for which no applications to appropriate are outstanding, he recognizes
and does not object to the trial court's use of "unappropriated" water as
synonymous with undeveloped water (water not actually applied to a beneficial
use). R. 576-578.
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Utah has, on average, 1.4 Million Acre Feet (MAF) of water per year
~

available under the Colorado River Compact. R. 668 at 81: 9-12; R. 669 at 271:
21 - 272:7. More than that amount has been approved for use on the State
Engineer's records, but development of Colorado River water rights lags
significantly behind approvals. R. 668 at 87: 14- 88: 15; R. 669 at 271 :21 272:18; R. 669 at 274:8-15. Thus, notwithstanding Plaintiffs' confusing claims to
the contrary, Aplt. Brief at 19-26, a portion of the Colorado River water allocated
to Utah by the Upper Colorado River Compact remains unused-Utah water users
currently deplete only about one MAF of the 1.4 MAF of water available to them
under current hydrologic conditions. R. 668 at 84: 19-22; R. 669 at 273 :24 274:13. In other words, the water rights that underlie the Change Applications are
part of Utah's allocated, but not yet developed, Colorado River supply.
The trial court correctly concluded that average Green River flows are
sufficient and Utah's allocation is not yet fully developed. 3 Water for Blue
Castle's use is physically available from the Green River as part of Utah's
Colorado River allocation at Blue Castle's proposed place of use under the
Districts' Change Applications. Thus, there is unappropriated water available in
the proposed source for the Change Applications.
3

Further, the Green River typically flows with 3.9 MAF per year, with base
flows ranging between 1,800 and 3,000 cubic feet per second in an average water
year. R. 668 at 95:25 - 97:3; R. 624 (Add. A).
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But even if the Green River did not have unappropriated water at the newly
proposed place of use, water made available by relinquishing the prior place of use
under the Districts' approved appropriation applications could provide the basis
for approval of their Change Applications under section 73-3-8(l)(a)(i). As the
trial court stated,
The question of unappropriated water is directly relevant when
considering an application to appropriate. But when evaluating a
change application ... the issue of unappropriated water cannot be
applied in exactly the same way. The water involved in a change
application is already approved for use. The change applicant seeks
to change an already approved use, either in terms of "point of
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use." §73-3-3(l)(a).
R. 626 (Add. A).
Most change applications are filed in water systems where all of the water
has been previously appropriated and is often fully beneficially used. The
required "unappropriated water" for a change application comes from the
relinquished, hydrologically-connected prior use. This "swap" allows "new" uses
to be met. Logically, where unappropriated water is present in a system and there
is not a queue of approved, but undeveloped, applications for beneficial use, there
is no need to change existing water rights-only to appropriate the unappropriated
water. Here, by contrast, there is a queue of approved, but undeveloped,
applications. The Bonham opinion does not comment on evaluating
"unappropriated water" in the change context. But if unappropriated water is not
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available in a particular water system, the water delivered under an applicant's
\41)

hydrologically-connected, existing water right may serve as the equivalent of the
"unappropriated water" in the proposed source.
The trial court, in its final order, recognized that "all water tributary to the
Colorado River Basin [is] hydrologically connected." R. 622 (Add. A). Because
"the water involved in a change application is already approved for use," R. 626
(Add. A), the trial court appropriately concluded, "Approval of the Applications
does not constitute a new appropriation of water within the Colorado River
Basin." R. 627 (Add. A). The Applications are instead new diversions from the
Green River, which is part of that Basin." R. 627 (Add. A) (emphasis added).
Consistent with this reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court has also recognized
that changes in places of diversion and use derive from existing water rights in

viJ

hydrologically-connected water sources. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake

Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108 (Utah 1943). Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. involved a
change application by Kents Lake Reservoir Company to move half the amount of
a storage water right from a Beaver River tributary, the "South Fork," to the
Beaver River itself, at a place called "Three Creeks." The entire amount of the
rights was not usually available on the South Fork tributary, and the applicant
must have hoped, before arriving at the Supreme Court, that moving half of its
right to Three Creeks would allow it to take the full amount of water the right
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seemed to allow. The Supreme Court, however, held, "In support of the proposed
change the defendant admits, as well it must, that storage under the transferred
rights must be limited to the amount that would have been available to [applicant]
Kents Lake for storage at the present South Fork location during the same period."
Id. at 111 (internal citation omitted). Likewise, "[t]he combined storage at South

Fork and at Three Creeks could not exceed the total amount available for storage
at that time in the South Fork." Id. at 111. For change applications, where the
water sources are hydrologically connected, the prior location's water provides the
basis, the measure, and the limit for the beneficial use in the new location. See
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (West 2004).
Here, the prior places of use for the Change Applications are hydrologically
connected to the new place of use on the Green River. R. 627 (Add. A). Thus, as
long as Blue Castle and the Districts forego use in the prior places of use and
withdraw only the same amount of water in the new place-according to priority
and in a manner that does not impair other vested water rights-their existing
water rights may be considered the equivalent of "unappropriated water" in the
proposed source for change application purposes. Consequently, whether or not
the trial court properly determined there is actual undeveloped and thus
"unappropriated water" in Green River, the change could be approved because, as
in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., Blue Castle's use at the new proposed place of
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diversion will be limited, both in terms of volume and priority date, to the amount
v.;d)

of water available at the original place of diversion. On either basis, this Court
can affirm the trial court's determination that there is reason to believe that
unappropriated water is available in the proposed source.

B.

Plaintiffs' arguments based on flows from the Flaming Gorge
Reservoir do not invalidate the district court's conclusion

Plaintiffs argue, incorrectly, that water withdrawals under the change on the
Green River must rely on releases from the Flaming Gorge Reservoir. Aplt. Brief
ViJ

at 21, Heading 1 ("[the Applications] improperly rely on instream flow releases
from Flaming Gorge Reservoir measured according to the requirements of the
Endangered Species Act, as the basis for claiming unappropriated water."
(capitalization altered)). Plaintiffs claim that "[fJlows in the Green River are

controlled by the Flaming Gorge Reserv~ir Operation Plan"4 and "no releases
from the reservoir are authorized during periods of low flow except for flows
designated as minimum instream flows under the Endangered Species Act [ESA]."
Aplt. Brief at 21. Further, Plaintiffs assert that "all releases from Flaming Gorge
Reservoir are intended to be left in the river undiverted from the point of release to
4

Plaintiffs supply no record citations to support these claims. The State
Engineer is unaware of a trial exhibit entitled "Flaming Gorge Operation Plan"
except as the "Operating Plan" may relate to a submitted Bureau of Reclamation
Record of Decision. See Ex. 20, Bureau of Reclamation Record of Decision,
Operation of Flaming Gorge Dam, Final Environmental Impact Statement,
February, 2006.
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Lake Powell in order to maintain and restore designated critical habitat. Operating

Plan, 1.1, Appendix 2." Aplt. Brief at 26.
Not only are Plaintiffs' assertions insufficiently supported, but their logical
premises are flawed. First, without appropriate supporting documentation from
Plaintiffs, the State Engineer can find no evidence in the record that water releases
from Flaming Gorge Reservoir must remain undiverted. Even assuming Plaintiffs'
"Operating Plan" is likely the 2006 "Record of Decision, Operation of Flaming
Gorge Dam, Final Environmental Impact Statement,'' submitted as Trial Exhibit
20 to the record, there is no section 1.1, and appendices are not attached. It is
impossible to evaluate Plaintiffs' argument without being able to identify
Plaintiffs' sources. The Bureau of Reclamation's Record of Decision states that
the goal of the Recovery Program is "to recover the listed species of the Upper
Colorado River to the point of de-listing, while allowing for the continued
operation and development of the water resources of the Upper Colorado River
Basin." Ex. 20 at 5. This dual purpose to allow for future development while
recovering the endangered fish is at odds with Plaintiffs' unsupported view that
water releases from Flaming Gorge cannot be diverted for use.
Second, Plaintiffs' assertions that "minimum" flows must remain in the river
as mandated by the ESA are equally unsupported. The 2006 Record of Decision
adopts a regime of Flaming Gorge flow releases "patterned so that the peak flows,
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durations, and base flows and temperatures, described ... would be achieved to
1./iP

the extent possible." Ex. 20 at 3. Operating Flaming Gorge Dam to reach the
flows "to the extent possible" is a far cry from Plaintiffs' claim that "no releases
from the reservoir are authorized during periods of low flow except for flows
designated as minimum instream flows under the Endangered Species Act." Aplt.
Brief at 21. Except for a general citation to the whole of the ESA, Aplt. Brief at
24, Plaintiffs cite to no section of the ESA that mandates absolute minimum flows
for the Green River, and the State Engineer knows of none.
Third, Plaintiffs' assertions that the Flaming Gorge Reservoir controls
Green River flows ignores that the Green River and its tributaries form an
interconnected system of which the reservoir is only a part. Basic hydrologic
principles establish that the further away a diversion is from the Flaming Gorge

v/J

Dam, the less dam releases influence the river's flow. Ex. 20 at 3. Many
tributaries enter the Green River below the Flaming Gorge Reservoir. As the
Bureau of Reclamation describes the three north-to-south geographical sections of
the Green River in its Record of Decision, "Reach 1 .... is almost entirely
regulated by releases from Flaming Gorge Dam..... In [Reach 2] flows from the
Yampa River combine with releases from Flaming Gorge Dam to provide a less
regulated flow regime than in Reach 1." Ex. 20 at 3. However, "[i]n [Reach 3,
where applicants seek to locate their water rights,] the Green River is further
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influenced by tributary flows from the White, Duchesne, Price, and San Rafael
Rivers." Id. at 3. The Green River system, with its many tributaries, is a large
watershed that spans southwest parts of Wyoming, northwest parts of Colorado,
and a large part of eastern Utah before joining with the Colorado River. See Ex.
67.
Because Plaintiffs fail to form a coherent argument against the trial court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law on this section 73-3-8 criterion, and fail to
support it with appropriate record citations, this Court should not disturb the trial
court's conclusion that there reason to believe there is "unappropriated water" for
the Change Applications in the proposed source.

III.

THE COURT REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CHANGE
APPLICATIONS DO NOT UNREASONABLY AFFECT PUBLIC
RECREATION AND THE NATURAL STREAM ENVIRONMENT
The Utah Code outlines the State Engineer's responsibilities for

investigating applications. In applicable part, the statute says:
If the state engineer, because of information in the state engineer's
possession obtained either by the state engineer's own investigation
or otherwise, has reason to believe than an application to appropriate
water ... will unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural
stream environment or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it
is the state engineer's duty to withhold approval or rejection of the
application until the state engineer has investigated the matter.
Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-8(b)(i) (West Supp. 2014).
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Although the statute is somewhat vague concerning what the State Engineer
\/Ji)

does with the findings of his investigation, he nevertheless, as a general rule,
investigates these issues and examines them thoroughly. Ex. 1 at 13-19; Ex. 5 at
14-20. As long as he satisfies himself after his own investigation on these issues,
which he may do as part of the "public welfare" analysis required under section
73-3-8{l)(a)(iii), he can appropriately rule on an application. 5 The statute contains
no specific requirement that the State Engineer or trial court deny a change
application if it will "unreasonably affect" public recreation or the natural stream
environment. Thus, to give meaning to this subsection and to employ the reasonto-believe standard on an application, those impacts are usually examined as part
of the public welfare criterion under section 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii). But in this case, the
trial court took the extra step of analyzing impacts to both "public recreation" and
the "natural stream environment" as if they were distinct and necessary
5

Plaintiffs' Brief requests in its conclusion "that the State Engineer fulfill
his statutory obligations and withhold a decision on the Change Applications until
the Bureau of Reclamation and other interested parties and agencies have
completed the ongoing Colorado River study that will ... allow the State Engineer
to properly act upon full information and a complete record." Aplt. Brief at 52.
First, this request misses the mark in addressing the remedy to the State Engineer.
The trial court here approved the applications. Second, the statute requires that
the State Engineer investigate the matter, not that he have perfect data and
complete information. All decisions involve weighing how much information is
enough to render an informed conclusion. Plaintiffs here would impose an
unreasonable "perfection" standard on the State Engineer which would, especially
in matters of underground water based on imperfect models, be impossible to
implement.
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requirements for the Applications' approval. R. 639-644 (Add. A). The State
Engineer did so as well. 6 Both concluded that the Applications would not
unreasonably affect either interest. 7 Ex. 6 at 14-21; Ex. 2 at 13-20; R. 640, 644
(Add. A). Because the statutory construction of public recreation and the natural
stream environment are questions of law, this Court owes no deference to the trial
court's interpretation of the legal rules as independent statutory criteria outside the
public welfare criterion in section 73-3-8(l)(a)(iii). However, generally, this
Court should afford the trial court significant discretion on whether the facts it
finds are within the reach of the statute's meaning.
The trial court evaluated public recreation on the Green River in light of the
flows in the Green River at Blue Castle's proposed point of diversion. R. at
639-640, ,J,r 85-86 (Add. A). The evidence before the trial court showed that for
99% of the time, Blue Castle's diversion will decrease the river's width by less
than 1.5 feet and its depth by less than 1.5 inches. R. at 640, ,r 85c-d (Add. A).
6

The State Engineer explained his investigation on issues of "public
welfare," "public recreation" and "natural stream environment" under a separate
( 1)(b )(i) section of his administrative Order on the Applications to demonstrate he
had complied with the statute in thoroughly investigating the matters. He reached
conclusions on each of these issues as well, anticipating disagreement over the
statutory requirements. Ex. 6 at 14-21; Ex. 2 at 13-20
7

All diversions have some impact on streams. Such impact is accepted as
part of the price for beneficial use of water in Utah's arid environment. The
question, then, is whether the impact to the natural stream environment is
"unreasonable."
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The court found this evidence sufficient reason to believe the reductions would not
vd

unreasonably impact rafting, river running, or fishing. R. at 640.
As Plaintiffs point out, present in the "natural stream environment" of the

~

Green River are four endangered fish species, protected from harm, or a "taking,"
by the BSA. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(l)(B) (2012); see

also Ex. 20 at 1. In a proactive attempt to recover and eventually delist the
endangered fish, Utah has participated in the Upper Colorado River Endangered
Fish Recovery Program ("Recovery Program"). 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (2012)
(regarding ESA cooperative agreements with states). This cooperative effort by
states, federal agencies, environmental groups, and others provides the reasonable
and prudent alternative required under the ESA to prevent a finding of a taking
when water is used in the Upper Basin. That program allows water use to
~

continue. 8 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3)(a) (2012) (ie. section 7 consultation); Ex. 20 at

5.
8

As part of that effort, the Bureau of Reclamation, in a February 6, 2006
Record of Decision, adopted the Action Alternative to operate Flaming Gorge
Dam to aid in fish recovery efforts. Ex. 20 at 1, 4. If all goes well and these
coordinated efforts succeed, the fish will no longer be endangered. At that time,
the fish species will be outside the special protections of the ESA, with their
management still regulated under state law. In the meantime, the river's regular
flows, including those from tributaries, supply many water users with the
opportunity to make beneficial use of river water for which they hold appropriated
water rights. And these water appropriators, as mandated by Utah law, "shall have
priority among themselves according to the dates of their respective
appropriations[.]" Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-21.1(2)(a) (West Supp. 2014).
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In short, under the ESA, Utah's participation in the Recovery Program
allows the state to continue to use its water rights while complying with the ESA's
protections for the endangered fish. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3)(a) (2012) (ie. section 7
consultation). Further, any water use for a power plant will require federal
licensing. The plant licensing process requires federal authority consultation
examining the impact water use will have to the endangered species. Plaintiffs
have failed to identify the authority under which they assert claims against the
Districts or State Engineer for ESA violations. This defect is especially troubling
in the absence of federal disapproval of the Applications.
The trial court fully examined public recreation and the natural stream
environment as separate components along with the section 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii)
requirement that the change "not prove detrimental to the public welfare." R.
639-648 (Add. A). Based on these complex evaluations, the court appropriately
concluded the Applications do not harm the public welfare or cause BSA-related
concerns. R. at 640, 644, 645-648 (Add. A). This Court should affirm that
finding under the deference provided by the Searle and Baby B. standards of
review.
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IV.
v/jj

THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
APPLICATIONS MEET ALL REMAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR
SECTION 73-3-8, INCLUDING THE APPLICANTS' FINANCIAL
ABILITY TO COMPLETE THE PROPOSED WORKS
In their third issue for review-contesting the trial court's conclusion that

the applicants have the financial ability to complete the proposed
works-Plaintiffs fail to confine themselves to the issue they have articulated.
Therefore, in an abundance of caution, the State Engineer reviews the remaining
statutory criteria Plaintiffs touch on from section 73-3-8 with an eye to the reason·.;J)

to-believe standard the trial court appropriately employed. Where the Plaintiffs
provide only weak evidence, if any, for their arguments, this Court should afford
the trial court significant discretion when reviewing the court's determination that
the Applications meet the applicable statutory criteria.
Other than a vague reference, Aplt. Brief at 51, Plaintiffs make no claims
that approving the change applications will impair other water rights. And the
trial court specifically found that with "conditions designed to mitigate potential
impairment," R. 628 ,r 42 (Add. A), "there is reason to believe that the
Applications will not impair existing rights." R. 629 (Add. A). The trial court
found that the Applications would not impair the few downstream water rights that
require only 37.2 cubic feet per second flow rate, R. at 628 ,r,r 39--40 (Add. A),
and no water users testified about impairment, R. at 628 ,r 41 (Add. A). Plaintiffs
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make no serious attack based on this criterion. This Court should afford the trial
court significant discretion in applying the law to the facts of this matter and
respect the trial court's conclusion as being in line with the Searle and Baby B.
standards of review.
Physical and economic feasibility are usually fact-intensive. For example, a
hypothetical plateau irrigation project, where water must be raised 300 feet above
a river bed, may be both or either physically or economically infeasible. Perhaps
no equipment exists to raise the amount of water needed to the top of the plateau,
thus rendering the project physically infeasible. Or perhaps the pumping can be
accomplished with very expensive available equipment, but the cost of electricity
to run the pumps will be twice the value of each year's farm crops-making such a
project economically infeasible. Physical and economic feasibility rest on whether
the water project or use can actually be achieved, a conclusion that should be
afforded increased deference because it is based on a variety of trial courtdetermined facts.
In the instant matter, the trial court considered the physical site for Blue
Castle's power plant and examined the physical and economic feasibility of the
nuclear power plant project. R. 630-632, 632-636 (Add. A). For the plant's
physical feasibility, the trial court determined that the proposed site, located near
necessary rail transportation, highways, and electrical transmission lines, R. 630 ,I
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47 (Add. A), along with ongoing testing and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
oversight to evaluate the site's suitability, R. 630 ,I 48-52 (Add. A), was sufficient
to declare the project physically feasible. R. 631-632 (Add. A). Feasible is
defined as "[c]apable of being done, executed, affected or accomplished." Black's

Law Dictionary 609 (6th ed. 1990). As the trial court concluded, again employing
the reason-to-believe standard articulated in Searle, the proposed Blue Castle
project is physically feasible-perhaps it is risky, perhaps it could fail, but there is
reasonable assurance, based on the evidence, of water for use in Blue Castle's
power plant. Under the Baby B. factors, 2012 UT 35 at ,I 42, this Court should
give significant discretion to the trial court's findings of fact on this matter and
whether those facts come within the reach of the statutory criterion.
The trial court also reasonably concluded that the project meets the criterion
for economic feasibility. The trial court found that Utah's place as third nationally
for population growth (growing 23.8% between 2000 and 2010) will increase
demands for electrical power in the State. R. 632 ,I 53, 55 (Add. A). The trial
court made several findings of fact regarding energy supply and demand for both
Utah and the nation. R. 632 ,I,r 55a-f, 56-60 (Add. A). In light of these findings,
the court ultimately concluded that the likely increase in future demand for
electricity makes the project economically feasible. R. 634-636 (Add. A). Again,
the project may be potentially risky, but it is doable with the economics on the side

33

of the need for future power plants.

See Bullock v. Hanks, 452 P .2d 866, 867

(Utah 1969) ("[T]he cost of [enlarging a ditch] would not be prohibitive and
render the proposed plan economically unfeasible."). Under the Searle standard,
the trial court's determination that there is reason to believe the venture may
succeed should be afforded significant discretion because it is based on relatively
complex facts involving the power industry. The trial court's conclusion that the
facts fulfill the statutory requirement for economic feasibility is reasonable and
Plaintiffs have failed to show otherwise.
Financial ability to complete proposed works is also a fact-dependent
approval criterion. The trial court's findings of fact on this matter, along with
witness demeanor and testimony on Blue Castle's finances, should therefore be
given significant discretion. However, as a preliminary question that is more a
question of law than of fact, the financial ability to complete proposed works does
not depend on a farmer, business entity, or homeowner, for example, having cash
on hand to complete an entire project at the time they apply for water use.
Financing is available for a potential homeowner who seeks to build a home and
needs a water right for domestic water use. The home buyer may have on hand
only enough cash for a down payment that will allow her to obtain financing to
build a house, but she is nevertheless considered to have the financial ability to
complete the proposed project. Financial calculations for a nuclear power plant
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are much more complex and lengthy, particularly with the drawn-out permitting
vl)

process. Still, the trial court believed Blue Castle had demonstrated its financial
ability, in part by raising and spending $17.5 million to obtain funding and capital
needed for each phase of the nuclear plant permitting process. R. 636 ,I 74b (Add.
A); R. 668 at 14:17-15:4. The trial court, echoing the State Engineer's finding,
said:
Blue Castle has demonstrated an ability to secure funding and
capital as needed, on a step-by-step basis to capitalize the Project and
has a plan to continue capitalizing the Project. Accordingly, the
Court finds that there exists reason to believe that Blue Castle has the
financial ability to complete the Project.
R. 637-638 (Add. A).
This finding reflects in part how the relatively low reason-to-believe
standard relates to the financial facts. The trial court, like the State Engineer,

v0

correctly determined there is reason to believe the applicants have the financial
ability to complete the proposed works commensurate with the application's

-.:a

current status in the application process. Plaintiffs have failed to show any
affirmative evidence that Blue Castle lacks this financial ability. Where Blue
Castle's evidence met its burden as an applicant, Plaintiffs' vague references to
"paucity of information," Aplt. Brief at 45, cannot carry the day. This Court
should afford the trial court significant discretion in applying the legal rule to the
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facts of this case and affirm the trial court's determination under the Searle
standard.
Good faith, as well as the intentions of the applicants as to speculation and
monopoly, rely, at least in part, on witness demeanor and the facts found at trial.
In keeping with the Supreme Court's Baby B. analysis, increased deference should
be given the trial court in determining whether the Applications meet these
criteria. 2012 UT 35, ,r 42 (for mixed questions of law and fact, "the degree to
which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the
trial judge," is a factor in determining the degree of deference to afford the trial
court).
Speculation "means holding the water itself for the purposes of
speculation." R. 638, 639 (Add. A). As the trial court found, there is "no reason
to believe" the applicants intend only to monopolize the water, R. 638 ,r 79 (Add.
A). In their brief, Plaintiffs incorrectly focus on the relative likelihood of an
admittedly ambitious project's completion-whether the project is likely to
actually beneficially use the underlying water rights. Aplt. Brief at 34-3 7. In
doing so, they misinterpret and misapply Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development
Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co. (Pinecrest Pipeline), 2004 UT 67, 98

P.3d 1, as support for their view that beneficial use by the project's future
operators cannot be attributed to the current applicants. Aplt. Brief at 34-35.
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Pinecrest Pipeline stands for a far more straightforward proposition-that one
vii

water user user cannot claim as their own the beneficial use of other water users.
In Pinecrest Pipeline, a Mr. Meyer, one of twenty-seven water users on a system,
claimed as his own water right all of the right that served several houses in a small
canyon. The plaintiff development company claimed title to the water right
through Meyer, and thus control of the water supply for the other users. The
Supreme Court, on that point, articulated the following rule:
[T]he doctrines of appropriation and beneficial use do not support
Meyer's claim that he is individually entitled to [the Water User's
Claim] WUC 57-8492. A water user's appropriations are limited to
the amount the user puts to beneficial use. Beneficial use is "the
basis, the measure, and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this
state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (2003).

Pinecrest Pipeline, 2004 UT 67 at ~ 24 (internal citations omitted).
The Court held that Meyer could not claim the beneficial use of other users.
Plaintiffs erroneously attempt to use this same reasoning to assert that Blue Castle
may not claim the future power plant owner's beneficial use as its own. Aplt.
Brief at 33-34. In doing so they misapply the reasoning of Pinecrest Pipeline to
these distinguishable facts. Blue Castle's potential sale of a power plant permit,
with necessary water rights, is more akin to a land developer who acquires house
building permits, land, and water rights to subdivide and develop land for
homeowners. If no municipal water is available, the land developer, who uses
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none of the domestic water necessary for occupying the houses, is not speculating
in water by selling a domestic water right as part of a residence. Such water rights

~

are a necessary part of a house purchase, and are not "speculative" merely because
the developer does not personally use the water rights.
Likewise, Plaintiffs' citation to Western Water v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, 184
P.3d 578, is inapposite and distinguishable from the facts here. There, Western
Water applied to the State Engineer for whatever water was available in the Salt
Lake and Utah Valley watersheds. When the State Engineer denied that
application, the applicants requested that he reconsider essentially to, in the
Court's words, "root around for unappropriated water and then award that water to
Western Water." Id.

~

26. The original State Engineer's administrative order

denying Western Water's application found that the application met none of the
section 73-3-8 criteria. The Western Water Court said, "[T]he State Engineer
concluded that the Original Application was filed for speculation or monopoly
because the only proposed beneficial use for the water was a plan to sell [the
water] to others. Indeed, the applicants had 'no lands, facilities, customers, or
contracts."' Id.

~

8; R. 639 (Add. A).

Gathering all available water, with no plan for use except sale of the
resource itself, disregards the bedrock statutory requirement that water may be
appropriated only for a beneficial use. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (West 2004).
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Attempting acquisition to remove the water from the public's reach-or to acquire
~

it to sell to those who would beneficially use it-is speculation. But, no facts in
evidence here demonstrate monopoly or speculation. Applicants demonstrated the
water is the means to a proposed end-power generation-and not the end itself.
Power generation is a recognized beneficial use and any future plans or
preparations that may sell the water as part of a business package for its intended
use do not render the Change Applications speculative.
Regarding another approval criterion, the scope of the "public welfare"
analysis should be confined as a matter of law to those water-related issues the
State Engineer can appropriately evaluate. The State Engineer is the state's water
authority. Utah Code Ann.§ 73-2-1(3) (West Supp. 2014). He has no background
or special training in nuclear regulatory issues. His expertise is in line with the

vJj)

statutory requirement that the use of water should not be contrary to the public's
expectations to have water used in furtherance of a particular public good-in this

..;;

case, the production of energy. That is not to say he has no responsibility to
examine all issues as thoroughly as a particular application may require, but he
cannot be expected to opine on whether the proposed nuclear power plant is a
"good idea" in light of the controversies that surround nuclear power as a longterm energy source. Further, no record evidence supports Plaintiffs' assertion that
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during normal operation, any completed power plant would command use of the
river to the detriment of other upstream users. Aplt. Brief at 22-23, 51.
In light of all evidence before the trial court, including witness demeanor
and factors not readily ascertainable from review of the record, this Court should
affirm the trial court's conclusion that there was reason to believe, under the

Searle standard, that approving the Change Applications "would not prove
detrimental to the public welfare." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii) (West
Supp. 2014).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State Engineer respectfully requests the Court
to affirm the district court's interpretation and application of section 73-3-8 as
supported by the facts that fall within the statute's ambit.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because the procedural posture of this case includes the State Engineer as a
statutory defendant at the trial below, and because oral argument would help the
Court understand the questions of fact and law particular to water at issue in this
matter, Defendant State Engineer encourages the Court to hold oral argument for
this case.
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Attorneys for Kane County Water
Conservancy District, San Juan County
Water Conservancy District and Blue
Castle Holdings
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY

FINDINGS OF FACT' CONCLUSIONS OF

HEAL UTAH, et al.

LAw AND

JUDGMENT APPROVING CHANGE APPLICATIONS

a35402

AND

a35874

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 120700009

vs.

KANE COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

(Consolidated case with Case No.
120700010)
Judge George M. Harmond

This matter was tried to the bench trial on September 23 through 27, 2013, sitting by
stipulation of the parties at Price, Utah. Plaintiffs were present and represented by John S.
Flitton and Lara A. Swensen. Defendants Blue Castle Holdings, Kane County Water
Conservancy District and San Juan County Conservancy District were present and represented
by David C. Wright and John H. Mabey, Jr. The Utah State Engineer, Kent Jones, was
represented by Julie I. Valdes. The Com1, having heard testimony, received exhibits, reviewed
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the trial briefs of the parties, and considered the arguments of counsel, and consistent with its
Memorandum Decision of November 27, 2013, makes the following findings of fact,
co~clusions of law and judgment.
INTRODUCTION

The Court is asked to approve two change applications, a35402, based on approved
Water Rights 89-74, 89-1285 and 89-1513 (Kane); and a35874, based on approved Water Right
09-462 (San Juan) ("Applications") concerning the use of water for a proposed nuclear power
plant near Green River, Utah. The Applications seek to use 53,600 acre-feet of water per year by
diverting up to 75 cubic feet per second ("cfs") continually from the Green River. Previously, the
water rights were approved for use in steam power generation at coal fired power plants. That
same use-electric power generation-is requested here.
Pursuant to his statutory duties concerning the administration of Utah's water, Utah Code
Ann. §73-2-1(3)(a)("The state engineer shall be responsible for the general administrative
supervision of the waters of the state and the measurement, appropriation, apportionment and
distribution of those waters."), the Utah State Engineer, Kent Jones, approved the Applications in
2012. The plaintiffs, HEAL Utah and others, protested the Applications and now challenge that
approval, requiring this court to apply the same statutory criteria in a de novo analysis pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §73-3-14. Kane and San Juan County Water Conservancy Districts and Blue
Castle Holdings are referred to together as the Applicants.
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Blue Castle Holdings ("Blue Castle") proposes to build a multi-unit nuclear powered
electrical generating plant near Green River, Emery County, Utah.

2

61.~
April 21, 2014 04:28 PM

2 of37

(

(

2. In preparation for obtaining federal licensing of the plant, Blue Castle has secured water
and some of the real property necessary for the operation of the proposed pant.
3. Transition Power Development, LLC, Blue Castle's predecessor in interest, leased from
the Kane County Water Conservancy District ("Kane") Water Right Nos. 89-74, 89-1285
and 89-1513, representing 29,600 acre-feet of water, the original diversion point of which
was from Lake Powell and Wahweap Creek in Southern Utah.
4. The Kane water right was filed on January 15, 1964, by another party for the
development of a coal-powered power plant near Lake Powell, with the water being
diverted from Lake Powell/Colorado River.
5. The Kane water right was approved on September 3, 1965, but was subordinated to the
Central Utah Project water rights and several other applications in the Uinta Basin and
the Duchesne River.
6. Over the years the Kane water right was transferred several times and, on November 24,
2003, it was transferred to Kane.
7. Transition Power also leased from the San Juan Water Conservancy District ("San Juan")
Water Right No. 09-462, representing 24,000 acre-feet of water, with the point of
diversion located on the San Juan River in San Juan County, Utah.
8. The San Juan water right at issue is a segregated portion of a water right originally filed
on October 14, 1965. The water right was segregated and approved in 1967 for a coalfired power plant near Mexican Hat, Utah.
9. The priority date for the San Juan water rights is April 21, 2000, as a result of an
application for reinstatement after the first approved application lapsed.
10. The water represented by both of these leases has previously been approved for use in the
operation of steam power generation at coal-fired power plants in Kane and San Juan
counties, but because those projects are no longer viable, the Districts have leased the
water rights to Blue Castle.
11. The Districts filed change applications a35402 and a35874 (the "Applications") to
change the points of diversion of the water to the Green River located near Green River,
Utah. The proposed place of use of the water is at the site of the proposed nuclear plant
in Emery County, located approximately 4.5 miles west of the Green River.
12. The change application for Kane was filed with the State Engineer on March 30, 2009,
3
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and foi- San Juan on August 27, 2009. The Applications were supported by Blue Castle,
which as the project developer, provided evidence in support of the Applications.

13. Blue Castle asserts that the nuclear power plant ("the Project") would consume and
deplete the entire 53,600 acre-feet of water represented by the Applications, drawing a
maximum of 75 cfs continuously from the Green River, primarily for use in creating
steam to generate power and for cooling the plant.

14. The Applications also seek approval to store 2,000 acre-feet of water in a reservoir
located on the Project site.

15. The state engineer, Kent Jones, ("State Engineee') held an adminish·ative hearing on the
Applications on January 12, 2010, and thereafter conducted extensive investigation.

16. In a decision dated January 20, 2012, the State Engineer approved the Applications to
change the points of diversion and allowed diversion and depletion of 53,600 acre-feet
and a diversion rate of up to 75 cfs. On February 28, 2012, the State Engineer denied a
Request for Reconsideration filed by certain protestants on February 9, 2012.

17. The Plaintiffs filed two actions on March 27, 2012, challenging the Applications in two
separate complaints. The actions were consolidated on May 16, 2012.

18. The court notes that the Project, if constructed, would be Utah's first nuclear power plant.
19. Blue Castle is developing the Project pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 52. The Project is
phased, and if it proceeds, the Project will require an environmental impact assessment
prior to the submission of an application for an Early Site Permit to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and then a full environmental impact statement prior to the
approval of the Early Site Permit. In order to construct and operate the Project, Blue
Castle would need a combined operating license from the NRC.

20. Plaintiffs make the argument that the State Engineer has ceded a final decision on Utah
water rights to federal agencies. But regardless of what is determined here, if the
environmental impacts cannot be resolved, the Project will not be able to use the water
rights.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE STATUTORY CRITERIA
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1. Legal Standards

In Utah, water belongs to the public and potential users must apply to the State Engineer
for authority to withdraw water from a natural source. Utah Code §73-1-1(1)-(2). To authorize
the use of water, whether it be a new application to appropriate or a change to an approved
applications' point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, the State Engineer must apply
the criteria mandated by statute. §73-3-8. See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah
1989).
All State Engineer administrative actions, unless designated otherwise, are informal
proceedings. Utah Admin. Code R655-6-2.
The legislature created the office of the State Engineer 'to keep records of
all established water rights and those to be acquired in the future, to
supervise the distribution of the water, and to keep records of and regulate
future appropriations and changes in the place of diversion, use and nature
of the use.' United States v. District Court, Utah, 238 P.2d 1132, I 134
(Utah 1951 ); see also Utah Code Ann. §73-2-1 (1989 & Supp. 2002)
(identifying responsibilities of the State Engineer). Due to the scarcity of
water resources in our state, appropriation of water is tightly controlled
and the State Engineer oversees each step in the application and
appropriation process.
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ,I28, 84 P. 3d 1134.

"A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer', has the ability to obtain judicial
review under the water statutes and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann.
§73-3-14 (1). The petitioner requesting judicial review is required to name the state engineer as
respondent.

§73-3-14(3)(a).

Pursuant to Utah Code §63G-4-402 (l)(a), this Court has

jurisdiction "to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal
adjudicative proceedings." The court, "without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and

5
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law." §63G-4-402(3)(a).
The court's review by trial de novo "means a new trial with no deference to the
administrative proceedings below." Archer v. Bd Of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142,
1145 (Utah 1995). The issues before the court in its plenary review are, "however, strictly
limited to those which were, or could have been, raised before the State Engineer." Crafts v.
Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983); Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, 134, 133

P.3d 382. The Supreme Court of Utah stated in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P .2d 745,
751 (Utah 1996), that:
Although it may be inappropriate to impose the same level of strict waiver
analysis that we have applied to issues or objections not raised before a
trial court, the failure to make known the nature of one's rights in the
course of an administrative proceeding clearly disentitles a party from
raising its claim for the first time before a district court on de novo review.
(citation omitted).
"[T]he decision of the court on review, except for the formalities of the trial and
judgment is of the same nature and for the same purpose [as that of the State Engineer.]" Searle,
2006 UT 16, 134. Accordingly, under §73-3-S(l)(a), it is the duty of the court to approve
applications for permanent changes in the point of diversion, the place of use, 'or the purpose of
use for which the water was originally appropriated, if the court has reason

to believe that:

There is unappropriated water in the proposed source;
The proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the more
beneficial use of the water;
The proposed plan is physically and economically feasible ... and would not
prove detrimental to the public welfare;
The applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works; and
6
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The application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of speculation
or monopoly.
The court is required to reject the application if it fails to meet the requirements of Utah
Code Ann. §73-3-S(l)(b).
Searle describes the procedure as "placing a fairly low burden on a party seeking

approval of a change application," but that it "must provide some meaningful barrier so that the
floodgates remain closed to all applications except those with a sufficient probability of
successful perfection." 2006 UT 16, if45, quoting Salt Lake CUy v. Boundary Springs Water

Users Ass'n., 270 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1954). Accordingly, Searle stated that it "must be clear
that the decision maker's determination that there is reason to believe is grounded in evidence
sufficient to make the belief reasonable." Id. 146. "[P]roducing evidence sufficient to block
approval of a change application is no doubt a difficult task for a protestant, illustrating
impairment by means not reliant on conjecture or probability would, in many cases, be an
impossible task." Id

,rss .

Although under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act the court may grant certain
relief, see §63G-4-404(b), in cases involving the de novo review of an order of the State
Engineer, the court is limited to "authorizing or denying the applicant the right to proceed with
his plan to appropriate the water the same as though it were made by the Engineer without an
appeal." Bullock v. Tracy, 294 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1956). The court simply "determines
whether the application should be approved or rejected and does not fix the rights of the parties
beyond the determination of the matter." Eardley v. Terry, 17 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1938). The
court may also, if it approves the change applications, impose conditions on the use of the water.
7
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When an application is approved, the applicant is permitted a certain period of time
within which to develop the proposed diversion and use of water. §73-3-12. If the water is not
applied to beneficial use within the statutory timelines, the applicant's water right lapses unless
an extension is granted. Id. A change of an approved application does not affect the priority of
the original application or extend the time period within which the construction of work is to
begin or be completed.

§73-3-3(8)(b). In times of water shortage, water rights in Utah are

regulated according to the prior appropriation doctrine and "the one first in time is first in
rights." §73-3-1(5).
The State Engineer has no authority to finally adjudicate water rights, but "only find that
there is reason to believe that the application may be granted and some water beneficially used
thereunder without interfering with the rights of others." U.S. v. Dist. Court, 238 P.2d 1132,

1137 (Utah 1951). An applicant can only proceed absent "injury to [prior] rights if he hopes to
perfect a right ... Legally, no one can be hurt by the procedure established by the Legislature. At
the same time, however, it permits the development of our water resources to the utmost."

Eardley, 17 P.2d at 366.
As stipulated by the parties and noted in the Scheduling Order and Trial Setting signed by
the court on August 15, 2013, the Districts "have the burden of proof throughout the proceeding
on the applications."

2. Analysis
The Court finds that Blue Castle and the Districts presented evidence sufficient to
establish that there is reason to believe that each of the statutory criteria have been met regarding
i

the applications. The Court has looked to the plain language of the statute and given effect to the

~
!

8

621
April 21, 2014 04:28 PM

8 of 37

(

(

language. See Salt Lake City. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, 127, 234 P.3d ll05. The
Court's "primary goal is to evince the tme intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v.

Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 18, 52 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is unappropriated water in the proposed source.

The Court first looks at the appropriations on a system-wide basis.

Like the State

Engineer, the Court considers all water tributary to the Colorado River Basin to be
hydrologically connected. Second, the court looks at water availability in the Green River at the
proposed point of diversion.
Plaintiffs argue that the State Engineer's statement that the Upper Colorado River Basin,
which includes the Green River, is "over-appropriated on paper," establishes that there cannot be
unappropriated water in the proposed source.
Findings:

21. The use of the Green River's water is regulated by the Colorado River Compact of 1922
and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948. Utah Code§ 73-12a-l et seq. and
§73-13-1 et seq.
22. Under the Colorado River Compact of 1922, Article III, ("Compact''), the Upper Basin

states (i.e., Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico) are required not to deplete the flow
of the Colorado River using water rights perfected after the 1922 Compact was signed
unless the Upper Basin provides to the Lower Basin 75 million acre-feet of water in any
continuous ten year period, as apportioned at Lee Ferry, Arizona, which equates to 7.5
million acre-feet per year on average. In addition, up to 750 thousand acre-feet per year
must be delivered to Mexico. 1
23. Since 1896, the Upper Basin states have always delivered the required water to the Lower
Basin and Mexico.
I The relationship between "Lee Ferry" and "Lees Ferry" may cause confusion. The Compact
identifies "Lee Ferry" as the division between the Upper and Lower Basin. One of the gauges
used to measure the flow, however, called the "Lees Ferry Gauge," is now located about one
mile upstream from "Lee Ferry."
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24. Under the Upper Compact, after subtracting 50,000 acre-feet for Arizona, the State of
Utah is apportioned 23 percent of the remaining water of the Basin, which is calculated at
approximately 1.4 million acre-feet per year.
25. To date, it is estimated by the State Engineer and Jerry Olds, former State Engineer, that
Utah has developed and uses approximately 1 million acre-feet per year of its Colorado
River allocation, leaving approximately 400,000 acre-feet (estimates are between 360,000
and 400,000 acre-feet) per year currently unappropriated. There is a difference between
water for which an application to appropriate has been made and approved and
appropriated water, that is water actually put to beneficial use. Water can be approved
for use under an application but that does not mean that the water is appropriated, that is,
beneficially used.
26. The Kane and San Juan water rights at issue here are among the many approved but
undeveloped applications on the Colorado River drainage in Utah.
27. At the present time, there are at least 574,600 acre-feet of approved yet undeveloped
water in the Upper Colorado River Basin in Utah for which the State Engineer has
previously approved appropriation applications, but which remains unappropriated,
including the Kane and San Juan Applications and also including Navajo and Ute Tribe
reserved water rights, leaving approximately 400,000 acre-feet of Colorado River Basin
water unappropriated.
28. Most of this 574,600 acre-feet of water has not been applied to beneficial use, and it is
unappropriated water available for use by those with approved applications at least up to
the limit of Utah's Colorado River allocation. If all of the water represented by the
approved applications for appropriation were actually appropriated, that is, put to
beneficial use, then Utah's allocation would in fact be over-appropriated.
29. At this point, however, the 574,600 acre-feet of water has not been put to, or applied to,
some useful industry or to a beneficial purpose. Under Utah law, the Upper Basin in
Utah is not, in fact, over appropriated.
30. The United States Bureau of Reclamation estimates that even under a rapid growth
scenario, by the year 2060, Utah will only have developed 1.38 million acre-feet of the
1.4 million acre-feet allotted to it under the Upper Compact. In addition, the underlying
water rights associated with the Kane and San Juan Applications are approved for

IO
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appropriation and have been accounted for in the approved, but undeveloped Utah water
of the Upper Basin.
31. The Green River has an average volume of 3.9 million acre-feet per year, as measured
from 1977 to 2007. For an average water year, the base flow ranges between 1,800 and
3,000 cfs. The undisputed evidence is further that the annual mean flow of the Green
River, measured at the USGS station at Green River, Utah, for more than a century is
6,048 cfs, with an annual mean volume of 4,381,000 acre-feet.
32. The flows fluctuate according to the time of year, being higher during spring runoff and
times of precipitation, and lower during dry summer months and colder months when the
river ices up in areas.
33. Based on historic flows at the Green River station, there has always been sufficient water
at the Green River USGS station to accommodate the amount of the diversion requested
in the Applications.
34. There are approximately 139 approved water rights (excluding stock watering rights) on
the Green River with points of diversion located between its confluence with the Price
River and confluence with the Colorado River, which water rights are approved to divert
125,000 acre-feet of water and deplete 56,500 acre~feet.
35. If all the existing approved rights were in use, the total depletion from the Green River
would be approximately 1.29% of the average volume measured at the Green River
station.
36. Most of these depletions occur above the Green River station. At this time, there remains
in Utah approximately 369,000 acre-feet of water in the Colorado River basin available
for development and to be applied to beneficial use.
37. It has never been necessary to regulate the Green River by priority because there have
always existed adequate flows in the Green River to accommodate the existing
appropriations.
38. The additional depletion of water from the Green River to support the Project would be
1.22% of the annual mean volume of the River, based on the data from the Green Giver
station gauge.
11
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a. This would result in a maximum expected decrease in the depth of the Green
River of less than one and one half inches, and an average decrease in width of
the Green River of approximately one foot, at the point of the Green River USGS
gaging station.
b. The average width of the Green is approximately three hundred and fifty feet.

c. Plaintiffs admit three facts on this point:
i.That the "underlying water right(s] associated with the [Applications]
[are] approved appropriation[s] that [have] not yet been developed.''
(Defense Ex. 47 at 3-4).
ii.That "[a]pproval of [the Applications] do[es] not constitute a new
appropriation of water within the Colorado River Basin .... " Id.

iii.They are instead "new diversion[s] from the Green River, "which is part
of that Basin." Id.
Conclusions of Law Concerning Unappropriated Water.
When the State Engineer approves a change application, the applicant acquires only the
right to develop the use of the water; the approved application is not an actual use of water.
Accordingly, under Utah law, an approved change application, such as the Applications here, is
not itself the actual use of water.
The three principal elements to constitute a valid appropriation of water,
and, as stated by the comt in the case of Low v. Rizor, 25 Or. 557, 37 Pac.
82, and approved by the same court in the case of the Nevada Ditch Co. v.
Bennett, 30 Or., 59, 45 Pac. 472, 60 Am. St. Rep. 777, are: (1) An intent to
apply it to some beneficial use; (2) a diversion from the natural channel by
means of a ditch, canal, or other structure; and (3) an application of it
within a reasonable time to some useful industry.
But we think the filing of a written application with the state engineer, as
required by the statute, is but declaring, or the giving of a notice of, an
intention to appropriate unappropriated public water. The final step, and

.i

(,

~

I
I
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the most essential element, to constitute a completed valid appropriation
of water, is the application of it to a beneficial purpose. Whatever else is
required to be or is done, until the actual application of the water is made
for a beneficial purpose, no valid appropriation has been effected.

vJrJ.

Sowardsv. Meagher, 108P.1112, 1116, 1117 (Utah 1910).
This Court finds that there is unappropriated water available for the Project in the
Colorado River Drainage in Utah, and specifically in the Green River.
The criterion of unappropriated water is found in §73-3-8(1)(a), which governs
applications to appropriate. The Applications seek to change the points of diversion and place
and nature of use of water that is already appropriated under approved applications.

The

statutory criteria for change application approval is §73-3-3. Since Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500,
however, §73-3-8's criteria applies to change applications.
The question of unappropriated water is directly relevant when considering an application
to app1·opriate. But when evaluating a change application, which by definition involves a prior,
approved application to appropriate, the issue of unappropriated water cannot be applied in
exactly the same way. The water involved in a change application is already approved for use.
The change applicant seeks to change an already approved use, either in terms of "point of
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use." §73-3-3(1)(a).
The Applications concern water already approved for appropriation within the Colorado
River drainage in Utah, but not yet appropriated, or actually applied to the approved use. As
explained by the State Engineer in the orders approving the Applications, the underlying water
rights associated with the Applications are approved appropriations that have not yet been
effected, i.e., developed to an actual beneficial use.

13
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Ultimately, a water user's appropriation is limited to the amount put to beneficial use.
"No one can acquire the right to use more water than is necessary, with reasonable efficiency, to
satisfy his beneficial requirements." McNaughton v. Eaton, 242 P.2d 570, 572 (Utah 1952). This
is true "regardless of the quantity [of water] that has been used for (past] purposes and the length
oftime it may have been used." Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 164 P. 856, 859
(Utah 1916). Because "[t]he right to use water in Utah has always depended upon its application
to beneficial use," Daniels Irr. Co. v. Daniel Summit Co., 571 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1977); a
user is "limited to the amount of water ... applied to a beneficial use, and not to an amount they
could have claimed or require." Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147, 150 (Utah 1911). See

also Utah Code Ann. §73-1-3 (1989) ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the
limit of all rights to the use of water in this state").
Approval of the Applications does not constitute a new appropriation of water within the
Colorado River Basin. The Applications are instead new diversions from the Green River, which
is part of that Basin. The water associated with the Applications is part of Utah's allocation
under the Colorado River Compact. Rather than divert water from Lake Powell and the San Juan
River, as previously authorized, the Applications propose to divert from another point still within
the Colorado River drainage.

Ther~fore, approval does not constitute a new appropriation.

Rather, approval permits the use of already approved water, but at a different place and for
electricity generation from nuclear power rather than coal.
Accordingly, determining whether there is unappropriated water in the proposed source
under §73-3-8, required an examination of water availability at the proposed new point of
diversion-the Green River.

14
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The Court concludes that there is adequate unappropriated water in the Upper Colorado
River drainage and the Green River in Utah to support the Applications.
Vil)-

The proposed use will not impair existing rights.
Findings of Fact:
39. The majority of the points of diversion of existing water rights users with senior priority
rights on the Green River are located above Blue Castle's proposed point of diversion and
will therefore not be impaired by the Project's diversion.
40. Aside from stockwatering rights, only 16 water rights divert downstream from the Project
to the confluence with the Colorado River. Those downstream water rights require 37.2
cfs and will not be impaired by the Applications because there is sufficient flow in the
Green River to satisfy both the downstream rights and the Applications.

41. There was no testimony by persons opposing the applications or any water rights owners
that any of their vested rights would be substantially impaired as a result of the proposed
change. The Couit did not receive any evidence that the Project would interfere with or
impair the rights of any vested water right holders on the Green River or the Colorado
River. As a result, the change applications cannot be rejected on this basis.

42. As the State Engineer did, the Court may also approve an application with conditions
designed to mitigate potential i_mpairment. Accordingly, the Project shall be subject to all
prior rights and subordinated to the Central Utah Project.
Conclusions of Law Concerning Impairment:
In Searle, quoting Salt Lake City. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n., 270 P.2d 453,

455 (Utah 1954) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added), the Utah Supreme Comt stated:
A change application cannot be rejected without a showing that vested
rights will thereby be substantially impaired. While the applicant has the
general burden of showing that no impairment of vested rights will result
from the change, the person opposing such application must fail if the
evidence does not disclose that his rights will be impaired.

Searle, 2006 UT 16, if26.
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See also Utah Code § 73-3-3(7)(a);
Except as provided by Section 73-3-30, the state engineer may not reject
a permanent or temporary change application for the sole reason that the
change would impair a vested water right.
The Court concludes that there is reason to believe that the Applications will not impair
existing rights.

The Project will not interfere with the more beneficial use of the water.
Findings of Fact:
43. The Court received no evidence of a more beneficial use of the water. Power generation,
under §73-3-8(l)(b) is equally beneficial as irrigation or domestic use.
44. The Court received no evidence that there exists a proposed use for domestic or culinary
purposes which the Project will impair.

45. Further, power generation is an important segment of Utah's economy, supporting
thousands of jobs and providing electricity at reasonable cost to the public and industry.

a. From 1985 to 2005, power generation provided more tax revenue to the state than
any other segment of the economy.
b. The Governor and Legislature have stated that providing for Utah's growing
energy needs is a priority. The Governor has challenged power producers in Utah
to develop generation resources that will allow Utah to meet its projected power
need and also export 25% of its power production.

c. According to the Utah Legislature"[i]t is the policy of this state to encourage the
development of independent and qualifying power production and cogeneration
facilities, to promote a diverse array of economical and permanently sustainable
energy resources in an environmentally acceptable manner, and to conserve our
finite and expensive energy resources and provide for their most efficient and
economic utilization." Utah Code§ 54-12-1(2).
d. The "State Energy Policy" is that: "Utah will promote the study of nuclear power
generation." Utah Code§ 63M-4-30l(c).
16
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e. The state has also codified the Western Interstate Nuclear Compact, which
provides that its "board shall have power to: (a) Encourage and promote cooperation among the party states in the development and utilization of nuclear and
related technologies and their application to industry and other fields." Utah
Code§ 19-11-201. Art. V.
f.

The Utah Legislature, Emery County, and Green River City have specifically
expressed support for the Project to be built.

Conclusion of Law Concerning More Beneficial Use of Water

The Court finds reason to believe that the Project will not interfere with the more
beneficial use of the water.
The proposed plan is physically feasible.
Findings:

46. Blue Castle has secured sufficient property in Emery County, Utah on which to locate the
Project, through a combination of purchase and options to purchase such property.
47. Blue Castle has selected this particular site because it meets the Project's needs for
proximity to rail transportation, an interstate highway, electrical transmission lines, and,
of course, to water.
48. Under the supervision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), the Project has
conducted geologic testing, archaeological studies, installed seismic monitoring
equipment, and has completed approximately 50% of the NRC Early Site Permit
application, at a total cost of $17.5 million to date. No physical impediments have been
identified that would prohibit construction of the Project.
49. An early site permit (ESP) resolves site safety, environmental protection, and emergency
preparedness issues independent of a specific nuclear plant design.
50. The ESP application must address the safety and environmental characteristics of the site
and evaluate potential physical impediments to developing an acceptable emergency
plan.

17
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51. The NRC documents its findings on site safety characteristics and emergency planning in
a Safety Evaluation Rep01i and on environmental protection issues in Draft and Final
Environmental Impact Statements.
52. The ESP process does not require a reactor design to be chosen at this point, and Blue
Castle has not done so. The Utah statute at issue does not require that Blue Castle
produce a final plant design at this point, only that the plan be physically feasible. The
basic elements of the Project are known and are feasible.

Conclusions Concerning Physical Feasibility:

Utah has not directly addressed the issue of physical feasibility as it is applied to
applications to change the point of diversion or to appropriate water. In Bullock v. Hanks, 452
P .2d 866, 867 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court's approval of an
application to appropriate water, where the district court had found that "it would appear that an
enlargement [of an irrigation ditch] would not be physically impossible ... " In City ofHilldale v.
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ~~22-34, 28 P.3d 697, the Supreme Court discussed the determination of

"highest and best use" of property in the context of valuing land for condemnation. The Court
held that ''highest and best use must reflect only 'potential development [that] could with
reasonable certainty be expected with respect to the property.'" Id at ,I23. The Court further

held that "a property's highest and best use includes only those uses that are feasible, not those
that are merely possible." Id One of the three elements of feasibility is "that the use is
physically feasibly -- that the land is physically suited or adaptable to the potential use." Id. at
,I24.
Using these two criteria, the Court concludes from the evidence presented that there is
18
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reason to believe the proposed plan is physically feasible because the physical site proposed for
the Project so far meets all the criteria necessary for the construction of the proposed works.
Vji)·

The proposed plan is economically feasible.
Findings:
~-

53. Utah is the third fastest growing state in the United States, and its growth rate increased
23.8% between 2000 and 2010.
54. PacifiCorp, the parent company of Rocky Mountain Power, which produces the majority
of electricity for the state of Utah, forecasts the growth in Utah will increase the load
demand for electricity 1.2% per year between 2013 and 2020.

55. The demand forecast takes into consideration increased efficiency and demand-side
management, including steps to encourage the effic~ent use of electricity resources.
a. Even with increased efficiency, the Governor forecasts a growth load between 2%
and 2.4% per year.
b. At that growth rate, by 2025 Utah will require 1,440 megawatts of new power
beyond that currently produced in the state.

c. By 2025, existing need and new growth load would require between 5,200 and
5,900 megawatts of electricity.
d. PacifiCorp's 2013 Integrated Resources Plan (IRP) forecasts a shortage of 2,308
megawatts of electricity by 2022, which PacifiCorp indicates will be met largely
by out of state wholesale market purchases.
e. In 2012, the Governor adopted an energy policy for the state of Utah, and one pa1t
of that policy identifies an energy initiative challenging Utah power producers to
construct 25% more generating capacity than the state requires for current power
needs, for purposes of export.

f. Problematically, in the 2011 IRP, PacifiCorp has not identified any new resources
to meet the needs it projects, and forecasts importing electricity to the state as
early as 2015.
19
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56. Natural gas, although currently at an all-time low cost, suffers from similar
environmental problems as coal, emitting carbon and contributing to visual pollution.
57. Further, natural gas producers are now beginning to export natural gas to foreign markets
in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) which will likely cause the price of domestic
natural gas to rise in the near future.
58. Solar and wind resources in Utah are de minimis at this time, primarily because of cost.
59. Even assuming the cost of these renewable resources becomes more palatable because of
the unavailability of coal generation of or natural gas cost increases, neither such resource
is suitable to produce base load power, that is, electricity available all the time.
a. Solar power is available normally only about 4 to 5 hours in an average day.
b. The technology to store wind or solar generated electricity is not available; there
exists only one pilot project for such storage on a commercial basis in the United
States at this time.
60. Nuclear power is ideal for base load power, produces no carbon or particulate emissions
and does not result in visual pollution.
61. Blue Castle has had discussions with eighteen utilities expressing an interest in 4,500
megawatts of power. Based on Blue Castle's water rights, the Project could supply 2,200
to 3000 megawatts of power.
62. Blue Castle established the cost-effectiveness of supplying nuclear power.
63. 98% of Utah's electricity is currently generated by fossil fuel power plants.
64. It is highly unlikely that any new coal plants will be constructed in Utah, or in the
western region where the Project would likely serve.
65. Should carbon capture and/or carbon tax regulations be enacted, it is further highly likely
that the cost of generation of electricity by the remaining coal power plants and natural
gas plants in the region will rise significantly.
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66. Historically, the cost per megawatt hour of nuclear power has been comparable with coal
and more predictable than natural gas, but the introduction of carbon capture legislation
or carbon regulation will likely make nuclear power permanently competitive with these
sources. This is because nuclear's production costs are lower than any other thermal
resource, thus offsetting nuclear' s higher capital costs.
67. Nuclear power generation is comparable to or less expensive per megawatt hour than
solar or wind generation. Because there exists no proven method of storage for wind and
solar, they are not feasible as base load power.
68. The price of natural gas, a multi-use fuel, is subject to price fluctuation, and is uncertain.
Such fuel price fluctuation results in significant electricity price fluctuation.
69. Nuclear generation is a consistent and stable base load power source, but has extremely
high construction costs. Future cost projections show that the cost of nuclear power
generated electricity is equivalent to or cheaper than other alternatives.
70. It is far from certain that Blue Castle will find partners to construct the nuclear plant
itself, but Blue Castle's business plan shows the Project, if built, will eventually be
profitable.

71. Blue Castle is not required to have a business plan that is ce11ai11 to succeed, but rather it
is only required to establish that its plan is economically feasible.
a. Blue Castle's goal at this point is to remove as much risk as possible during the
licensing phase of the plant, to make the ultimate construction of a nuclear plant
as attractive to utilities or other investors as possible.
b. This approach is feasible and is consistent with current practices in the planning,
construction and financing of nuclear plants.
72. Even though there are high construction costs associated with a nuclear plant, at this
point the Court concludes that there is reason to believe the Project is economically
feasible once operational.
Conclusions of Law Concerning Economic Feasibility:
In the context of valuing the use of property in connection with an eminent domain
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action, the Utah Supreme Court defined "economic feasibility" as evidence that there is
"sufficient demand for the potential use.,' City of Hilldale, 2001 UT 56, if24. As with the issue
(,

"""'

of physical feasibility, the Utah appellate courts have not specifically ruled on what "economic
feasibility" means in the context of appropriation of water, pa1ticularly on such a large scale as
contemplated in the Project. However, the statute's plain language only requires reason to
believe the proposed plan to use or dive1t the water is economically feasible, regardless of the
size of the project contemplated. In Bulloct the Utah Supreme Cou1t held:
Defendants argue that no applicant should be required at the approval
stage to expend the money to design completely a dam, spillway, and
other works and to dig test holes and expend other substantial amounts of
money to assure he has a reservoir site. Such an expenditure is unmerited,
since the application may be disapproved on some other ground, such as,
nonavailablity of water. With this contention, we agree; the standard
applied by this comt in United States v. District Court of Fourth Judicial
District is equally appropriate in the instant action.

Bullock, 452 P.2d at 868.
Utah law does not require the proponents of an application to prove that their entire
project will be economically feasible by expending all of the required monies at this stage of the
process.

In Bullock, the Court upheld the district court's ruling relative to the economic

feasibility of a plan to appropriate water by stating: "The State Engineer testified that he merely
determines if there be a reasonable probability that a dam can be built, that water can be
impounded, and that water will be available to be impounded, diverted and placed on the lands;

if these requirements be met, the project is considered feasible. The State Engineer stated that on
this project he determined whether it could, not would, be feasible." Id. at 867-868.
The Comt went on to explain:

22

63;')
April 21, 2014 04:28 PM

22 of 37

....,..

(

/

(

l

the law provides a period of experimentation during which ways and
means may be sought to make beneficial use of more water under the
application before the rights of the parties are finally adjudicated. If we
were to finally adjudicate applicant's right to change or to appropriate
water at the time that such application was rejected or approved, he would
get only such rights as he could establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that he could use beneficially without interfering with the rights
of others and in such hearing he would not have the benefit of any
opportunity to experiment and demonstrate what he could do. Such a
system would cut off the possibility of establishing many valuable rights
without a chance to demonstrate what could be done.

..;; .

Bullock, 452 P .2d at 868.
Based on these criteria, the Court concludes that there is reason to believe that the plan
for the Project is economically feasible.

Blue Castle has the financial ability to complete the proposed works.
Findings:
73. The total cost of the Project through buildout is estimated to be between $15 to $20
billion, and Blue Castle does not contend that it has the ability to accumulate that amount
presently or on its own.
74. Blue Castle has a staged plan to build the Project and is proceeding under 10 CFR Part
52.
a. The cost of obtaining approval for an Early Site Permit (ESP) from the NRC is
estimated to be in approximately $50 million.
b. Blue Castle has raised (and spent) $17.5 million so far of the necessary capital to
obtain the ESP.
c. It has been working on the Project for over 6 years, and is on target in its
development plan.
d. Blue Castle has not borrowed any money at this point, and has met all of its
financial obligations.
e. It has conducted preparation, studies, and drafted strategic business plans.
23
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The Project is a phased process and Blue Castle is not required, at this stage, to
have the entire project financed to completion.

75. The approach Blue Castle has adopted for the project (i.e., removing as much risk as
possible in the early permitting process) makes it more likely that it will eventually find
strategic partners to construct the power plant itself.
76. It is clear that financing for nuclear power is inherently risky and that funding is difficult
and highly selective. However, this does not mean that the Project is impossible. Blue
Castle has provided sufficient evidence that it is possible, and that there is reason to
believe that the Project will be completed.
Conclusions of Law Concerning Financial Ability:
As with the requirements of physical and economic feasibility, the requirement that the
applicant have the financial ability to complete the proposed works has had little appellate
attention in Utah.

In Searle, the Utah Supreme Court, in applying the "reason to believe"

standard to all the statutory criteria of §73-3-8, held that this standard was designed to "provide
some meaningful barrier so that the floodgates remain closed to all applications except those
with a sufficient probability of successful perfection."

2006 UT 16, 1[45. This standard is

applicable to the issue of financial ability.
As Searle recognized, the change applicant, Blue Castle in this case, "assumes a risk by
investing time and money in an effott to perfect a proposed change in use that may later be
effectively disallowed or modified by a court in an adjudicatory proceeding." Id. at 140. This is
a risk that Blue Castle has assumed, and apart from the water at issue here, no public funds have
been used on this project.
Blue Castle has demonstrated an ability to secure funding and capital as needed, on a
step-by-step basis to capitalize the Project and has a plan to continue capitalizing the Project.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there exists reason to believe that Blue Castle has the financial
24
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ability to complete the Project.

"""

The Applications were filed in good faith and not for purposes of speculation or
monopoly.
Findings:
77. Blue Castle has a specific plan to use the water for a purpose specifically identified in the
statute as a beneficial use, not to develop the water only to sell it to others.
78. While the Project is certainly ambitious, Blue Castle has mapped out a clear pathway to
achieve its plan.
79. There is no reason to believe that Blue Castle intends only to monopolize the water.
80. The fact that Blue Castle does not intend to build the actual power plant itself without the
assistance of other entities, but rather to intends to market the NRC license through a "derisking" process to make the Project attractive to investors, does not amount to
speculation within the meaning of the statute. Ultimately, if the Project is approved by
the NRC and built to completion, the water will be put to beneficial use for the statutory
purpose.
81. Moreover, Paragraph 9 of the Water Right Lease Agreement between San Juan and Blue
Castle, dated September 15, 2010, states:
During the pre-operation payment period, Lessor shall be entitled to use or
lease all or a portion of the Lease Water not required by Lessee on a shortterm basis, at no cost to Lessor, for so long as the Lease Water is not
actually required for diversion and use by Lessee."
82. The Water Right Lease Agreement between Blue Castle and Kane contains similar
language in Paragraph 15, "Requirements Contract and Use of Water Right," stating:
Lessor shall be entitled to use, rent, or lease all or a portion of the Lease
Water not required by Lessee on a short-term basis, at no cost to Lessor,
for so long as the Lease Water is not actually required for diversion and
use by Lessee."
83. These terms provide that the Districts are not deprived of short-term use of the water
during the development of the Project.
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84. To date, Blue Castle has spent $17.5 million working on the Project.
a. None of that money has come from external financing, but instead it has all been
provided by the investors who are, in turn, part of the project.
b. Because the private investors are willing to risk enormous amounts of their own
money and time in the Project, the risk of speculation or monopoly is minimal.
Conclusions of Law Concerning Speculation or Monopoly:

When considering the terms "speculation" and "monopoly" the Court looks to the plain
meaning of the statute, in the context of what the statute intends to regulate. In this case, the
Plaintiffs claim the Project's ultimate completion is speculative, in that the scope of the Project
and the money needed to complete the project make it unlikely to succeed, and Blue Castle will
therefore prevent other uses of the water. However, within the context of §73-3-8, "speculation"
means holding the water itself for the purposes of speculation. See Western Water, LLC v. Olds,
2008 UT 18, 18, 184 P .3d 578; "Fifth, the State Engineer concluded that the Original Application
was fi1ed for speculation or monopoly because the only proposed beneficial use for the water
was a plan to sell it to others. Indeed, the applicants had 'no lands, facilities, customers, or
contracts."
The Court concludes that there is reason to believe the Applications were filed in good
faith and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly.
The Applications will not unreasonably affect public recreation._
Findings:

85. The evidence presented at trial establishes that
a. as an average, 95% of the time the impact of diverting 70 cfs from the Green
River will have less than a 5% reduction on the flow rate of the river;
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b. as an average, 99% of the time even with the 70 cfs withdrawal, the discharge of
the river wilJ be above 700 cfs;
~-

c. 99% of the time the width of the river will be reduced less than 1.5 feet, out of an
average width of approximately 350 feet; and
d. 99% ofthe time the depth of the river would be reduced less than 1.5 inches.
86. The Applicants presented evidence that public recreation (e.g., rafting, river running, or
fishing) would not be affected by the proposed withdrawal. There was no evidence
presented by the Plaintiffs that public recreation would be affected if the applications
were approved.
Conclusions of Law Concerning Public Recreation

There is reason to believe that the Applications will not unreasonably affect public
recreation.
There is reason to believe that the Applications will not unreasonably affect the natural
stream environment.
Findings:

87. The issues raised at trial relative to the natural stream environment primarily focused on
the effect on endangered species and fallout from the cooling towers.
88. There exists four species of endangered fish that are unique to the Colorado River
system.
89. The stretch of the Green and Colorado Rivers from Flaming Gorge Reservoir to Lake
Powell includes critical habitat for the endangered fish.
90. The Green River in particular is designated as critical habitat for the four endangered
fish, but Blue Castle's expert testimony was that the water withdrawn from the Green
River would have a de minimus effect on the protected species.
91. Defendants' expert, Dr. Harold Tyus, testified that there would be an effect, but was
unable to opine as to the extent of that effect without futther research.
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a. Dr. Tyus testified that the surface area of the average backwater on the river may
be reduced by as much as 50%, at times when the river depth would be decreased
by over 1.5 inches.
b. However, Dr. Tyus was unsure of the impact of the potential loss of this surface
area on the fish population.
92. Testimony from Dr. Hardy, Applicants' expert, indicated that the depth necessary for the
fish larvae and fry to survive and thrive was between 29 to 38 centimeters (i.e.,
approximately 11 to 14 inches).
a. The evidence disclosed that with the proposed withdrawal for the Project, 99% of
the time the flow rate of the river would exceed 700 cfs, and the change in depth
would be less than 1.5 inches. 95% of the time, the flow rate would be above
1,300 cfs and the corresponding drop in river depth would be below I inch.
b. There is no evidence that the proposed withdrawal would have an unreasonable
impact on the natural stream environment.
93. The State Engineer acknowledged that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
processes would ultimately reach the conclusion of whether the Project would unduly
impact the natural stream environment and the protected fishes.
94. In fact, the purpose of NEPA is to address the questions raised by Dr. Tyus.
a. Based on the NEPA requirement, the State Engineer determined that he had
reason to believe that the NEPA process would identify measures necessary to
mitigate negative impact to the natural stream environment.
b. Regardless of any further investigation by the State Engineer, the Project will be
subject to NEPA, and the State Engineer conditioned the Application on a
biological consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant to
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
95. The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fishes Recovery Implementation Program
Recovery Action Plan (RlPRAP) is a partnership created in 1988 to address the recovery
of the four endangered fishes in the Upper Basin.
a. RIPRAP provides participants with a "reasonable and prudent alternative" to
avoid a jeopardy finding.
28
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b. Existing diversions are allowed under RJPRAP, as are new diversions.
viP·

c. Utah is a partner in RIPRAP, and the program is supported by the State Engineer.
d. The goal of RIPRAP is to achieve naturally self-sustaining populations and
protect the habitat and water flows on which they depend such that the fishes can
eventually be de-listed.
e. Requiring a Section 7 consultation will ensure that the Project must cooperate
with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFSWS") and the Bureau of
Reclamation to coordinate releases and take other steps to reach the goals of
RIPRAP.

~-

96. The US Bureau of Reclamation is working with the USFWS to develop an operation plan
for Flaming Gorge Dam releases in order to meet the goals of RIPRAP.
97. In September 2005, the USFWS released the Final Biological Opinion on the Operation
of Flaming Gorge Dam.
a. The Final Opinion stated that the operation of the dam would achieve the flow
and temperature recommended for the survival of the fishes, while maintaining all
authorized purposes, including the development of water resources.
b. Several months later, in February 2006, the Bureau of Reclamation issues a
Record of Decision ("ROD")(Defense Ex. 20) which stated similar goals. It
stated:
The purpose of the proposed action is to operate Flaming Gorge Dam to
protect and assist in recovery of the populations and designated critical
habitat of the four endangered fishes, while maintaining all authorized
purposes of the Flaming Gorge Unit of the Colorado River Storage
Project (CPSP) including those related to the development of water
resources in accordance with the Colorado River Compact. [Emphasis
added.]
This action is limited to the proposition that avoiding jeopardy and making
progress toward recovery of listed fish facilitates the ability of the Upper
Basin States to continue utilizing and further develop their Colorado River
apportionments.

29
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98. If, as Plaintiffs contend, the ROD requires base flows to remain undiverted in the Green
River to satisfy the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, no one between Flaming
Gorge and the confluence of the Green and Colorado rivers would be able to divert or use
any water.
99. To the contrary, the ROD clearly anticipates further development of the water of the
Green River and notes a target flow of 1300 cfs.
100.Utah has developed the "Utah Work Plan 2010" in conformity with the state's
commitment to RJPRAP. Of the 4 million acre-feet at the Green River, Utah station, only
1.4 million acre-feet is released from Flaming Gorge Dam. The majority of flows at the
Green River station, then, come from the tributaries to the Green River downstream from
the dam.
101.The Flaming Gorge releases have an impact, clearly, but make up much less than half of
the available water at the Green River station.
I 02. The NRC has promulgated comprehensive regulations (Environmental Standard Review
Plan, 5 .2.1. Hydro logic Alterations and Plant Water Supply)(Defense Ex. 51) with regard
to the hydrologic alterations that a nuclear plant may cause, including minimizing any
"adverse environmental impacts."
103.The NRC Regulatory Guide 4.7, General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power
Stations (Defense Ex. 52), in conformance with NEPA, also outlines the comprehensive
study to be undertaken by the NRC and the applicant.
a. This process allows for public comment. See 10 CPR Part 51 et seq. "Numerous
public meetings ... are held during the course of the reactor licensing process."
Backgrounder, pg. 2. 2
b. The NEPA review includes analyses of impacts to air, water, animal life,
vegetation, natural resources, and property of historic, archaeological, or
architectural significance.
c. Both of these regulatory guides call for close examination of the effect that the
operation of the plant will have on the Green River, and specifically include the
impact of the cooling system with regard to drift and its effect on the natural

l

I
f
~

~
l

2 The Court was provided with an NRC Backgrounder, titled "Nuclear Power Plant Licensing
Process." That document is referred to as "Backgrounder."

i
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vegetation and crops in the vicinity of the Project site.
d. The review also evaluates cumulative economic, social, cultural, and other
impacts and environmental justice.
e. Accordingly, even if the State Engineer were to have expended the significant
resources necessary to address the Plaintiffs' concerns by conducting further
studies, the NRC and NEPA requirements are not optional, and cannot be
circumvented by anything the State Engineer requires.

f. Further, neither the State Engineer nor this Court is equipped to study cooling
system design or drift. If Blue Castle is unable to comply with the requirements
of the NRC, an ESP will not issue.
I 04.Given the compulsory federal regulations and the burden of proof at this point in the
proceedings under Utah law, it would be unnecessary and inappropriate for this Court to
attempt to make a final determination of whether the Project will have any unreasonable
effect on the natural stream environment.
105.Because of the comprehensive nature of the NRC review process, and the information
presented at trial regarding the likely effect on the Green River and its biota, the Court is
convinced that there is reason to believe that there will not be any unreasonable effect on
the natural stream environment.

Conclusions of Law Concerning Natural Stream Environment

There is reason to believe that the approved Applications will not unreasonably affect the
natural stream environment of the Green River.
The Applications are not detrimental to the public welfare.
Findings:

106.AII nuclear power plant applications must undergo a safety review, an environmental
review and antitrust review by the NRC.
31
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I 07.In order to construct or operate a nuclear power plant, an applicant must submit a Safety
.Analysis Report.
a. This document contains the design information and criteria for the proposed
reactor and comprehensive data on the proposed site.
b. It also discusses various hypothetical accident situations and safety features of the
plant that prevent accidents or, if accidents should occur, lessen their effects.
c. In addition, the application must contain a comprehensive assessment of the
environmental impact of the proposed plant." (From the US NRC Backgrounder).
108.In July 2011, the NRC issued a report concluding that "a sequence of events like the
Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and some appropriate
mitigations measures have been implemented, reducing the likelihood of core damage
and radiological releases."
109.The Court has considered that the Central Utah Project (CUP) supplies water for
municipal purposes to more than 600,000 people on the Wasatch Front, has expended
significant taxpayer funds, puts water to beneficial use, and provides for the general
health and welfare of the public.
a. The Project's potential impact on CUP would impact the general welfare of a
large segment of Utah's population center.
b. The State Engineer determined, and the Court agrees, that the Kane County Water
Conservancy District Application should be subordinated for purposes of priority
distribution of water rights held by entities for use in the CUP.
c. With this condition in place, the Court finds that there is reason to believe that the
Applications will not be detrimental to the public welfare.

I I 0. The Court finds that the additional conditions imposed by the State Engineer are
reasonable and necessary and hereby adopts those conditions.
Conclusions of Law Concerning Public Welfare:

"The existing Utah and federal pollution regulation schemes impose a dimension of
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control separate and apart from appropriation and allocation." Michele Engel, Water Quality
~-

Control: The Reality of Priority in Utah Groundwater Management, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 491,
508 (1992).
The nuclear power industry is heavily regulated by the NRC. Under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (the "Act"), the NRC is responsible for the development and regulation of nuclear
energy, radiological health, and the safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. §2021 is the Federal-State
amendment, which provides that the NRC retains sole authority and responsibility with respect to
the construction and operation of nuclear production or utilization facilities. 42 U.S.C. §2021
allowed the State of Utah to enter into an agreement that gives Utah the authority to license and
inspect byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials used or possessed within Utah. That
authority is exercised by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality's Radiation Control
Board ("UDEQ RCB"), but their authority does not, and cannot, extend to the construction or
operation of nuclear power plants.
The UEDQ RCB has the authority to make rules to protect the public and environment
within Utah from significant sources of radiation, mainly from radioactive waste or the source
materials.

Utah Code

§19-3-104(4) states: "The board may make rules: (a) necessary for

controlling exposure to sources of radiation that constitute a significant health hazard"; however,
the scope of Utah's authority is limited and does not include the construction or operation of
nuclear power plants, which cannot be delegated by the NRC.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (c)

"Commission regulation of certain activities:"
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall
provide for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall
retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of-(1) the
construction and operation of any production or utilization facility or any
33
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uranium enrichment facility ...
The federal statute, according to Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10 th Cir.

1987), references "production facility" for the manufacture of "special nuclear material," not the
extraction of "source material," such as uranium.

The federal Act largely preempts the

regulation of commercial nuclear power plants at the state and local level. However, the Act
provides and allows for state and local involvement. The US Supreme Court, in Pacific Gas &
Elc. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm 'n. 461 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1983), said:

[F]rom the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, through several
revisions, and to the present day, Congress has preserved the dual
regulation of nuclear-powered electricity generation: the Federal
Government maintains complete control of the safety and "nuclear"
aspects of energy generations; the States exercise their traditional
authority over the need for additional generative capacity, the type of
generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, NRC licenses "can be issued only consistently
with the health and safety of the public. But the responsibility of safeguarding the health and
safety belongs under the statute to the Commission." Power Reactor Development Co. v.
International Union, 367 U.S. 396, 404 (1961). The NRC will address the Project's impact on

surface and groundwater, physical and environmental aquatic impact, and potential discharge
(from the air or otherwise) into surface water and groundwater, and potential surface and
groundwater contamination issues.

There is reason to believe that a nuclear power plant

constructed under the NRC licensing processes will not be detrimental to the public welfare.

In addition, the State Engineer will continue to retain jurisdiction to participate in the
review and approval (or disapproval) of diversion structure plans and the construction of water
storage facilities, when such plans are made known.
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While concerns regarding radiological health are valid, based on NRC review and state
oversight of the Radiation Control Board and the State Engineer, together with a lack of evidence
indicating negative health or safety impacts from the construction or operation of the nuclear
power facility, the Court finds that there is reason to believe that neither the NRC nor the state
Depai1ment of Environmental Quality's Radiation Control Board, will allow the Project to
proceed in a manner which will be detrimental to the public welfare or safety.
This Court's initial threshold determination that there is reason to believe that the Project
will not prove detrimental to the public welfare is the first of many that must be made in the
Projecfs process. See Power Reactor, 367 U.S. at 407 ("We think the great weight of the
argument supports the position taken by the PRDC and by the Commission, that Reg. 50.35
permits the Commission to defer a definitive safety finding until operation is actually licensed.")
Based on the compulsory and stringent NRC review regarding health and safety issues,
together with state oversight of the source materials and waste, the Court has reason to believe
that the proposed plan will not prove detrimental to the public welfare.
JUDGMENT

A. Applications a35402 and a35874 are approved subject to the following conditions:
1. The diversion and depletion under Application 89-74 (a35402) is limited to 29,600
acre-feet annually and under Application 09-462 (a35874) to 24,000 acre-feet
annually; the total rate of diversion may not exceed 75 cfs.

2. Blue Castle shall install and maintain measuring and totalizing recording devices to
meter all water diverted from the Green River and shall annually report the data to the
Division of Water Rights Water Use Program.

3. Blue Castle shall successfully complete a Section 7 consultation with the USFWS and
comply with all required conservation measures.
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4. Prior to altering the natural channel or construction of any diversion structure, Blue
Castle must file and receive approval of a Stream Alteration Permit with the Division
of Water Rights. See Utah Code 73-3-29 and Rule R655-13 of the Utah
Administrative Code.

5. If a dam or any water impounding structure is constructed, Blue Castle must provide
the Dam Safety Section of the Division of Water Rights with the plans and
specifications. See Utah Code 73-5a-101 et seq. and Rule 655-11 of the Utah
Administrative Code. Construction of the dam or other structure may only
commence once the necessary authorizations are obtained.
6. Acquisition of all necessary easements, rights of way, or title to property must be
obtained prior to construction.
7. Blue Castle must comply with all local, state and federal statutes, ordinances, and
rules in connection with the construction of the project.
8. The Applications are subject to prior rights, and the Kane County Water Conservancy
District Application is expressly subordinated to the water rights held by various
entities for use in the CUP for purposes of priority distribution of water.
B. After an application is approved, an applicant is empowered to construct all necessary
works and use the water in the manner contemplated by the change application.
However, no water will be diverted or used until such time as all other regulatory
requirements are met.
C. The water must be put to beneficial use and proof filed on or before September 30, 2015
for Application No. 89-74 (a35402) and on or before November 30, 2017 for Application
No. 09-462 (a35874). Requests for extension may also be filed. Otherwise the
Applications will lapse pursuant to Utah law.
D. As the prevailing parties, Kane and San Juan County Water Conservancy Districts and
Blue Castle Holdings are entitled to their costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, to be established by a memorandum of costs.

------------------------END OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT----
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Approved as to Form:
~-

John S. Flitton
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Isl Julie 1 Valdes
Julie I. Valdes
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Utah State Engineer
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on April 18, 2014, the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment (revised according to tlte Court's April 17, 2014, Order Dil-ecting Clumges) was
delivered to the following by E-filing/Electronic Delivery
John S.Flitton-johnflitton@me.com
Lara A. Swensen - laraswensen@me.com
Flitton & Swensen
1840 Sun Peak Drive, #B 102
Park City, Utah 84098
Julie I. Valdes - jvaldes@utah.gov
Assistant Attorney General
1594 West North Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

Isl McKell Ashcroft
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